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Abstract 
This paper addresses the enduring insistence on the moral dimension of international economic 
relations in Keynes’s economics and diplomacy. The issue has so far raised scarce attention in the 
literature, which tend to attribute some outstanding failures of Keynes’s economic diplomacy to 
the presumed instrumental use Keynes made of moral arguments. The paper provides a 
comprehensive account of the ethical arguments used by Keynes in his lifelong attempt to design a 
fair international order, and aims to demonstrate that this moral dimension is part of a well-
defined ethics of international relations which privileges national policy space and freedom to 
choose.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A remarkable effect of the current global crisis is the revival of interest for the ethics of international 
economic relations. Only time will tell whether the ʹBretton Woods IIʹ system is a stable configuration of 
international monetary order or simply a theoretical construction based on the observed characteristics of 
the delicate U.S.-China duopoly of recent years. For sure, the absence of a coherent set of shared rules for 
international adjustment, a permanent feature of the international nonsystem which followed the collapse of 
the Bretton Woods order, is inducing politicians, economists and opinion-makers, in the times of the crisis, to 
make extensive use of moral arguments when dealing with international economic relations.  
Once the moralist Washington Consensus paradigm had finally broken down both as policy 
prescription for development and as cure for nations hit by the financial crises of the Nineties, a wide 
spectrum of developing countries chose to adopt unorthodox, gradualist growth strategies based on a mix of 
current account surpluses, exchange rate undervaluation and reserves accumulation. A huge debate 
developed about which countries should be blamed for the surge of global imbalances which accompanied 
this policy shift in emerging markets. Various versions of the ʹtwin deficitsʹ theory (Chinn 2005) and 
criticisms of the ʹexorbitant privilegeʹ granted to the United States as the international reserve country 
accused the global debtor of last resort of immoral profligacy. Conversely, Bernanke’s (2005) ʹglobal saving 
glutʹ theory attributed the rise of global imbalances to developing (particularly Asian) countries’ mercantilist 
strategies. Both these ʹmade inʹ interpretations of current account disequilibria (see Carabelli and Cedrini 
2010a) guiltily omitted relevant parts of the story, respectively America’s role as the locomotive of world 
growth and the need, for developing countries, to integrate safely into international trade. Hence the success 
of the systemic ʹBretton Woods IIʹ view about global imbalances, with its generally benevolent disposition 
toward both surplus and deficit countries.  
Yet this enlarged perspective inevitably sheds light on a major shortcoming of our non-system: ʹ[t]he 
global economy cannot support developing countries’ attempt to integrate into the global trading system 
through export-led development and eliminate international imbalances if developed countries also use 
export-led growthʹ (Kregel 2006, p. 171). This line of reasoning may apply also to creditor/debtor 
relationships in developed regions such as the European Union. Despite Europe’s broad external balance, 
Germany is one of the world’s largest surplus country, a consequence of years of export-led growth 
strategies with sluggish internal demand. Greece is a perfect example of irresponsible debtor, yet a growing 
number of economists are rather focusing on Germany’s policies, when reasoning about the probable 
consequences of the austerity cure for the continent’s financial problems. According to Rodrik (2010), for 
instance (Roubini 2010 and Soros 2010 take similar stances), ʹGermany has to thank deficit countries like the 
US, or Spain and Greece in Europe, for propping up its industries and preventing its unemployment rate 
from rising further. For a wealthy economy that is supposed to contribute to global economic stability, 
Germany is not only failing to do its fair share, but is free-riding on other countries’ economiesʹ. Keynes 
seems in the air. Stiglitz (2010) is more explicit: ʹGermany (like China) views its high savings and export 
prowess as virtues, not vices. But John Maynard Keynes pointed out that surpluses lead to weak global 
aggregate demand – countries running surpluses exert a ʹnegative externalityʹ on their trading partners. 
Indeed, Keynes believed that it was surplus countries, far more than deficit countries, that posed a threat to 
global prosperityʹ.  
After decades of disrepute, Keynes has regained popularity in the times of the global crisis: echoes of 
a ʹKeynes solutionʹ such as the one dealt with in Davidson’s latest book (2009) can be found in a remarkable 
number of analyses of the current situation and proposals for global reform (see for instance Alessandrini 
and Fratianni 2009). Despite the rediscovery of Keynes’s plans for symmetric international adjustment 
between creditor and debtor countries, still relatively unexplored is exactly the ethics of international 
economic relations underlying the economist’s attempts to design a fair international order. In the paper, we 
provide a comprehensive account of the ethical arguments used by Keynes in this regard, and revisit, with 
special concern for the moral and methodological issues involved, some crucial episodes of his economic 
diplomacy. Our aim is to demonstrate that far from being the weak element in the search for a sounder 
international political economy, the moral dimension of Keynes’s economics and diplomacy helps clarify the 
essential traits of his desired new global order. More importantly, Keynes’s insights into the moral 
dimension of creditor/debtor relationships at the international level might be of precious help in today’s 
debate about what Stiglitz, among others, calls the ʹunacceptableʹ social and economic consequences of the 
current arrangements between debtor and creditor countries.  
 
II. TWO CRITICISMS OF KEYNES’S USE OF MORAL ARGUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 
AND DIPLOMACY 
With few exceptions, the literature has so far given scarce attention to the use made by John Maynard 
Keynes of moral arguments in some key passages of his economic diplomacy. Economists and historians 
tend to consider his reiterated insistence on the moral dimension of international economic relations as a 
weapon of doubtful utility in a context of power politics, where (British) ʹbrainsʹ cannot compete with (the 
Americans’) ʹmoney bagsʹ. In this framework, Keynes’s moral arguments are never examined in their 
autonomy from other (financial) considerations. They are rather treated, on one hand, as a veil Keynes 
allegedly attempted to pose on economic obligations to make them less binding or prevent them from 
working, as in the case of Britain’s American debt at the end of World War I. Or, on the other, as an imperfect 
substitute for finance and purely economic considerations in providing cogency to the line of reasoning 
underlying Keynes’s most imaginative plans, like his proposal for an American gift to Britain in 1945.  
 The first criticism, which could be named the ʹmorals as a veilʹ critique, dates back to a broadcast talk 
given by Keynes on 3 May 1928, later appeared in New Republic as ʹA London View of the War Debtsʹ. On 
discussing the opportunity to revise the Dawes Plan, Keynes pointed out that due to the complex 
architecture of Inter-Allied indebtedness, a reduction of the maximum annuities Germany should 
correspond would have made the United States the sole beneficiary of the scheme: in that case, ʹmany will 
feel that this is not an outcome tolerable to the sentiments of mankind or in reasonable accord with the 
spoken professions of Americans when they entered the war or afterwardsʹ (The Collected Writings of John 
Maynard Keynes, vol. 9, p. 52; hereafter: CW). Keynes was there attacking, nine years after his proposal for an 
all-round cancellation of Inter-Allied debts, the American view of war debts as ʹbusiness transactionsʹ (p. 48). 
Revamping his criticisms to the United States for having used Britain as a ʹconduit pipeʹ (CW 16, p. 279) for 
American credits to the Allies, Keynes stressed that such debts essentially resulted from America’s late entry 
into war and her inability to help the Allies in any other way than by financial contributions, even for some 
time after she came into war. The London view of debts was on the contrary that they ʹwere not made as 
business transactions and should not be treated as suchʹ (ib.), to the extent that Britain was still ready, if the 
United States had ceased insisting on debts repayment, to forgo her claims on European countries and her 
share of Germany reparations in favour of the Allies. The editors of New Republic ʹrecorded a v̒igorous 
dissent̉ and took issue with Keynes’s moral arguments. Although agreeing that both reparations and debt 
settlements must be scaled down and as a practical matter together, the editors insisted that this must be 
justified by economic circumstances, rather than the d̒ubious moral attitudes̉ with which Mr Keynes and his 
associates – so well qualified to urge economic reasons – were v̒eiling the controversỷʹ (CW 18, p. 296). 
 In his Fighting for Britain, Skidelsky (2000) provides a direct illustration of the second kind of 
criticism – the ʹmorals rather than financeʹ critique. In the 1945 memorandum ʹOverseas Financial Policy in 
Stage IIIʹ, Keynes named ʹJusticeʹ his preferred alternative for Britain’s economic destiny for the transition to 
the Bretton Woods order: a general reconsideration of the war burden according to the part effectively had 
by Britain, the United States and the sterling area countries in financing the war. Both the United States and 
the sterling countries should have relieved Britain of the debts incurred during the first years of war, and 
provide her with fresh financial assistance to ease her transition to a financially open world of multilateral 
free trade. Somehow echoing Edward Playfair’s 1941 characterization of Keynes as a too proud or naïve 
negotiator, inclined to use ‚moral indignation‛ as a substitute for business arguments (reported in 
Moggridge 1992, p. 657), Skidelsky maintains that ʹ*t+he coherence of his memorandum lay in the realm of 
morals rather than finance. Keynes was using Justice in its classic Aristotelian sense of just desertʹ (2000, p. 
384). Though ʹnot just a cloak for self-interestʹ, Keynes’s morality was certainly ʹa vehicle for illusion. The 
hope for gifts to rescue Britain from the consequences of policy had become by 1945 a necessary illusion – 
the only way of averting the eyes of British policymakers from the truth that in fighting a ʹjustʹ war Britain 
had lost its position as a Great Powerʹ (ib.). ʹJusticeʹ would thus be the weak element of an ill-conceived tactic 
destined to fail in any event: ʹGreat Powers are kept going not by gratitude, but by incentives – carrots and 
sticks – they can deploy to induce other Powers to do what they wantʹ (p. 385).  
The literature seems quite sure about the instrumental character of the moral arguments used by 
Keynes with the American negotiators, and employs this factor as a clue to understand some of the 
outstanding failures of his diplomacy. The ʹFighting for Britainʹ view favours an interpretation of Keynes as 
the ʹdefender of the Empireʹ (Boughton 2002, p. 12), or at least as ʹthe Last of the Romansʹ (De Cecco 1977, p. 
18), who instrumentally invokes moral arguments ʹin the attempt to construct an international economic 
environment which would help Britain to adjust to a lesser roleʹ (p. 23). By deliberately choosing to disregard 
the moral dimension of Keynes’s international Weltanschauung, however, this framework fails to heed two 
key aspects of Keynes’s international economics. First, the ʹFighting for Britainʹ view tends to dismiss the 
relevance of the dilemmatic nature of decision-making in the international setting, which Keynes conceives 
as a complex system characterized by organic interdependence and heterogeneity of policies. Second, it 
neglects the continuity between Keynes’s ethics of international economic relations and the anti-utilitarian 
philosophy underlying his general approach to economics as an instrument to eradicate the ʹeconomic 
problemʹ, and the precondition to enjoy what he defined as a ʹmoral lifeʹ, safeguarding variety while 
widening (as he wrote in the General Theory) ʹthe field for the exercise of personal choiceʹ.  
 
III. MORALS AS A VEIL? FIRST WORLD WAR AND INTER-ALLIED DEBTS 
The Head, since January 1917, of the ʹAʹ Division of the Treasury, responsible for financial relations with the 
Allies and the United States, Keynes was ʹthe Treasury official who knew most closely at the time the exact 
circumstancesʹ in which Inter-Allied debts were incurred (CW 18, p. 104). Keynes was so ʹintimate with the 
detailsʹ, he wrote at the beginning of World War II, to feel obliged to warn his government that if there was ʹa 
moral to be drawn from last time’s experienceʹ, it was that ʹthe arrangements for the credits should be quite 
differentʹ (CW 22, p. 26). On the occasion of the first payments of German reparations, Keynes indicated 
three objections to the view of Inter-Allied debts as ʹjust like any ordinary commercial debt for goods sold 
and deliveredʹ, namely ʹthe origin of the debt, the evils which would follow on an attempt to exact them, and 
the practical impossibility of collectionʹ (CW 18, p. 264). Yet, only the third aspect, which involves purely 
financial considerations, has been discussed at length in the literature on Keynes’s diplomacy. The second 
and particularly the first ones, related respectively to the prospected outlook of future international trade 
and the peculiar historical circumstances in which Inter-Allied debts were incurred, have received much less 
attention.  
 
1. The origins and nature of Inter-Allied debts 
Inter-Allied debts of World War I originate from the specific ʹarrangements for the creditsʹ (CW 22, p. 26) 
devised for fighting Germany. London had financed the Allies’ purchases in Britain, in the empire, and in 
most neutral countries. Moreover, she had guaranteed and financed Russia’s, Italy’s (since September 1915) 
and France’s (since May 1916) purchases in the United States, and had acted to support the French exchange 
(see Burk 1979). Already in October 1916, Keynes had warned that Britain was bound to fall in a condition of 
almost complete financial dependence on the United States. The problem was exacerbated by the need to 
preserve the exchange rate of sterling vis-à-vis the dollar, which Keynes considered as the financial pivot of 
the alliance against Germany (Dimsdale 1975, p. 151). Absent American support, he wrote in a secret 
memorandum of those days, Britain could not ʹsatisfy successfully the unexampled demand which the 
efficient prosecution of the war by the alliance as a whole now entailsʹ (CW 16, p. 209). Yet in July 1917, after 
the declaration of war by the United States, the Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo made clear that ʹAmerica’s 
cooperation cannot mean that America can assume the entire burden of financing the warʹ (in Burk 1979, p. 
410), and announced the intention to reduce financial assistance destined to sustain what the United States 
saw as little more than a ʹsentimental exaggerationʹ (CW 16, p. 240), that is the dollar/sterling exchange rate 
in New York.  
In drafting the Chancellor’s reply to McAdoo’s cable, Keynes compared the relative financial 
sacrifices incurred by Britain and the United States during the war. He claimed that ʹeven since America 
came into the war the financial assistance afforded to the other allies by the United Kingdom has been more 
than double the assistance afforded them by the United States, and that the assistance the United Kingdom 
has afforded these other allies much exceeds the assistance she has herself received from the United Statesʹ 
(CW 16, pp. 246-47). He then criticized America’s policy of limiting her assistance to the Allies’ purchases 
within the United States, in recognition of the fact that ʹsuch assistance involves a much less onerous burden 
than financial assistance abroadʹ (p. 247). As he was to explain in a future memorandum, ʹBefore the U.S. 
came into the war we had made ourselves almost wholly responsible for the foreign financing of the allianceʹ 
(p. 279). Despite ʹprompt and generous assistanceʹ on the part of the Americans, ʹthe financial burden 
continued to fallʹ, even after the latter’s entry into the war, ʹmainly on our shoulders in the first instance 
while we threw forward onto the U.S. largely in the form of the assistance we had to ask from them to 
support the sterling exchange, such part as we were unable to carry ourselvesʹ (p. 280).  
In July 1917, Britain’s resources were exhausted. Keynes believed that ʹunless the United States 
Government can meet in full our expenses in the United States, including exchange, the whole financial 
fabric of the alliance will collapseʹ (CW 16, p. 250). The policy of supporting the sterling/dollar exchange rate 
was in fact functional to the stability ʹnot only of the allied exchanges on New York, but also of their 
exchanges on all neutral countriesʹ (257). The psychological effects of the abandonment of the exchange 
could have been disastrous: ʹ[t]o point out the depreciation of the German exchanges and the stability of our 
own has been our favourite form of propaganda in all parts of the worldʹ (p. 222). While venturing ʹto appeal 
to the United States of America for sympathetic consideration in financial discussionsʹ (p. 248), Keynes asked 
her ʹto be the judge of how great a burden she can support. At the present stage of the conflict her resources 
are greater than ours. She has not only her own pre-war resourcesʹ, he stressed with force, ʹbut more than 
£200 million additional in actual gold with which the allies have furnished her in the past three yearsʹ. 
America could not ʹrender a more valuable serviceʹ (p. 262) than allowing the Allies more than they could 
afford. 
Keynes’s words were successful in persuading the American government to concede Britain the 
financial assistance required to avoid the abandonment of the gold standard. The price to be paid was 
however higher than expected: as observed by the Treasury representative in Washington, Sir Basil Blackett, 
Britain was passing from the condition of (the most) ʹimportune beggarʹ to the eyes of the Americans to that 
of ʹfellow solvent creditor in the Alliance against Germanyʹ (in Moggridge 1992, p. 276). To Keynes’s 
disappointment, this justified and legitimated the role of ʹconduit pipeʹ (CW 16, p. 280) for American 
assistance to the alliance as assigned to her by Washington. Keynes was perfectly aware that the United 
States had a strong interest in reducing Britain to a position of financial dependence, so as to facilitate the 
shift in world supremacy from London to Washington. He polemically stressed that ʹ [t]he American public 
felt a not unnatural willingness to show greater generosity to the allies who relatively were financially weak, 
and were more inclined in giving assistance to have regard to the sacrifices an ally had suffered than to 
financial security it could offerʹ (p. 277), and declared to have ʹalways understood hitherto that political 
criticism was to be feared not on the ground that U.K. was receiving too small a share of the U.S. Treasury’s 
advances but that they were receiving too large a shareʹ (pp. 276-77). 
Still, he proved wise enough to recognize that the unsatisfactory character of the existing agreement 
should be attributed to the clash of ʹconflicting interests (...) increasingly opposed not only to one another but 
to the efficient conduct of warʹ (CW 16, p. 274): the United States had an interest to press the Allies to 
purchase outside her own borders, whilst it was to the interest of Britain to induce them to place them within 
America. He warned that ʹ*u+nless considerations of self-interest are put entirely on one side by one party or 
the other, which is a counsel of perfection, such a system is bound to lead to disputes and suspicions which 
are unseemly in themselves and detrimental in their consequences to the common causeʹ (p. 281). Hence the 
need of a ʹmutual understandingʹ, on the part of the ʹjoint paymasters of the allianceʹ, ʹon broad principles of 
equity and efficient action in view of all relevant circumstancesʹ (p. 274). The United States should have 
taken over the financing of France’s and Italy’s needs and proportionally reduced loans to Britain, and 
allowed London to use the dollar obtained from supplying the Allies (with resources purchased outside 
America) to meet part of her own American expenditures.  
ʹThe business of allied supply and of pooling resources could be conducted with a single eye to 
efficiencyʹ, with ʹgreat moral and political gainsʹ. By eliminating the ʹconfused currents of self-interest which 
now darken counselʹ, the proposal would have raised the respective policies of purchases and supply ʹand 
the advice we tender to one another (...) above the suspicion of being influenced by interested financial 
motivesʹ (CW 16, p. 284). After both the United States and the Allies had rejected the suggestion, Keynes 
made no secret of his disappointment: ʹ[i]t almost looks as if [the Americans] took a satisfaction in reducing 
us to a position of complete financial helplessness and dependence in which the call loan is a noose round 
our necks and whenever obligations of ours mature in future we shall have to submit any condition they 
may choose to imposeʹ (p. 287). 
The effort to understand the non-economic nature of Inter-Allied debts was to Keynes as important 
as that of revisiting their historical origins. In their response to Keynes’s 1928 article The London View of Debt, 
the editors of New Republic made clear that in the ʹAmerican Viewʹ, war debts were not to be conceived as 
business investments but had a ʹmorally bindingʹ (CW 18, p. 298) character and should be clearly 
distinguished from reparations. Not ʹdubious moral attitudesʹ (ib.) but ʹeconomic circumstancesʹ should 
provide the rationale for reducing debts and reparation: the fact, that is, that ʹthey will be either difficult or 
impossible to pay, and such obligations should not be continued so far into the future. The reason they are so 
difficult is that they are international obligations not arising out of productive use of human resources. This 
certainly has an important moral aspect of its ownʹ (pp. 298-99).  
Keynes’s position is far more complicated, as shown by his correspondence with sociologist John M. 
Micklin of the Dartmouth College of Hanover on The London View of Debt. His polemical attitude towards the 
United States Governments after World War I, he explained, was motivated by the American refusal to 
consider jointly (thus recognizing the linkage between) ʹthe circumstances out of which the debts aroseʹ and 
ʹthe desirability of clearing up the future situationʹ (CW 18, p. 302). Keynes declared that he laid ʹat least as 
much stress on the first as on the second [reason]. Since my own country has offered to go further than any 
other in the direction of abating her legal claims, I am at liberty to speak freely. Americans who share your 
view are prepared, I gather to act to some extent on the second of the above reasons, namely the desirability 
of clearing up the future; but not on the first of the reasons. Moreover, they are very fond of urging us that if 
Europe really wants the cash she had better conceal her true feelings about the American position on the first 
point. I daresay this is trueʹ (ib.). 
But the first reason did make much sense to Keynes. In response to a letter from an American 
correspondent, Mr. Amberson, he explained that ʹif America had announced from the first that they were 
advancing money, not to save civilisation, or any phrase of that kind, but as the best business investment 
available in the circumstances, no one would have objected to their maintaining the same business attitude 
subsequentlyʹ (CW 18, p. 300). In The London View of Debt, Keynes had observed that it would have been ʹvery 
illogicalʹ to regard Inter-Allied debts ʹas being in the nature of ordinary investments ... For we often gave 
assistance in the form of money, precisely because we were less able to assist with men or shipsʹ (CW 9, p. 
48). He had pointed out that the Allies were charged for the British guns they had bought and used in the 
first years of war, not for gunners sent by London when matters got worse. Likewise, the United States was 
asking Britain to repay materials and munitions received until the American entry into the war, but London 
was charged nothing for American soldiers helping the Allies to defeat Germany. ʹEvidentlyʹ, he concluded, 
ʹthere is not so much logic in a system which causes us to owe money to America, not because at first she 
was able to help us so much, but because at first she was able to help us, so far at least as manpower was 
concerned, so littleʹ (ib.).  
Not only logic, but also ʹreason (...), justice or common senseʹ (CW 18, p. 266), Keynes wrote in 1925, 
were missing in the system. As a ʹconduit pipeʹ for American financial assistance, Britain had lent to the 
Allies, after America’s entry into the war, an amount roughly equal (£750 million) to what she herself had 
borrowed from the United States (£850 million). Two conflicting views of the sums at stake impeded the 
cancellation of Inter-Allied debts as prompted for by Keynes in The Economic Consequences of the Peace: the 
American view was that they ʹought to be treated as investments, just like any other business transaction (...) 
that they should be taken at their face value, that is to say, as bonds due and payable, tempered only by 
considerations as to the capacity of the debtor to pay and, in practice, by a willingness on the part of the 
United States to accept a low rate of interestʹ (CW 9, p. 49). On the contrary, the British view of such debts 
paid regard ʹto their origin and to the circumstances in which they were madeʹ (ib.): they had not been made 
as business transactions and should not have been treated as such.  
In an article written for the Daily Mail on the occasion of the last instalment of the American debt 
paid by Britain in December 1932, Keynes declared: ʹI cannot regard this problem as primarily one of the 
economic consequences of payment. It is a question of historic justice and of what is right and proper 
between nationsʹ (CW 18, p. 382). Since there ʹnever were any profitable assets corresponding to the sums 
borrowedʹ, he stated, war debts were simply ʹa case of pure usuryʹ: ʹ*i+t would be a good, not a bad, 
precedent for the future, to establish a distinction between money lent internationally to foster a war and 
money lent to build, for example, a railwayʹ (ib.). The concepts of ʹprofitʹ and ʹinterestʹ simply do not apply to 
the former case: ʹIf anyone expects to make a profit out of financing war, there is no harm done if it turns out 
a bad risk. War loans should never be made except out of sympathy with the cause of the borrower, and the 
gradual repayment of the sum lent without interest is the most that should be expected. If I lend money to a 
man to help him expand his business, I am entitled to ask interest. If I lend money to a friend to help him out 
of a tight place, where there can be no question of his earning a profit, I expect no more than the repayment 
of my loanʹ (p. 383). From Britain’s ʹgreater eagerness in a common causeʹ – her ʹwholeheartednessʹ as ʹthe 
sole reasonʹ of her owing money – followed, he observed, that the debt was of a ʹnon-commercialʹ nature, 
and that its measure should be ʹ[t]he replacement cost today of the wheat, cotton, copper, chemicals and 
munitions which we purchasedʹ at ʹprofiteering pricesʹ (p. 384) to conduct the war.  
 
2. The evils of Inter-allied debts and reparations 
Keynes’s proposal for an all-round cancellation of Inter-Allied debts dates back to November 1918. It is 
however in The Economic Consequences of the Peace that Keynes establishes clearly and conclusively the 
linkage between such debts and German reparations: ʹfairness requiresʹ, he wrote on presenting his 
suggestion, that the reduction of reparations to a sustainable amount of resources based on Germany’s 
capacity to pay ʹshould be accompanied by a readjustment of its apportionment between the Alliesʹ (CW 2, p. 
170) through the cancellation of Inter-Allied indebtedness. As we have shown elsewhere (see Caabelli and 
Cedrini 2010b), Keynes conceived Inter-Allied debts forgiveness as an indispensable precondition to solve 
the problems inherited from the war. In his vision, in fact, the economic organization of the European 
continent was characterized by organic interdependence: the Treaty of Versailles simply ignored ʹthe 
economic solidarity of Europe, and by aiming at the destruction of the economic life of Germany it 
threaten[ed] the health and prosperity of the Allies themselvesʹ (CW 17, p. 58). Yet, due to the burden of 
Inter-Allied debts, the Allies were caught in an irresoluble ʹdilemmaʹ (CW 2, p. 58). ʹ*D+eeply and inextricably 
intertwined with their victims by hidden psychic and economic bondsʹ (p. 2), the Allies could not recede 
from asking Germany for indemnities which were not only impossible to collect but also potentially 
devastating for themselves, ʹunless one could at the same time point out to them some alternative mode of 
escape from their troublesʹ (p. 94).  
The way out of the impasse lay exactly in asking the United States and Britain to cancel war debts. 
Britain should have renounced her share of reparations in cash to the advantage of the Allies, and made ʹan 
appeal to the generosity of the United Statesʹ (CW 2, p. 93), whom Keynes believed to be ʹgreatly at faultʹ, in 
the negotiations of the Treaty, for ʹhaving no constructive proposals whatever to offer to a suffering and 
distracted Europeʹ (p. 94). Though recognizing that this could not ʹprovide any compelling argument for 
Americansʹ, Keynes compared the financial sacrifices of the United States and Europe during the war to 
persuade them that Europe was entitled to ask for such concessions, and that ʹan Englishman is not seeking 
to avoid due sacrifice on his country’s partʹ (p. 175). The appeal to American generosity was simply 
ʹinevitableʹ (p. 92), not only because the United States ʹcould better afford to make the sacrifice than Britain 
and the Alliesʹ (Dimsdale, 1975, p. 157): the generalized situation of conflict involving the Allies and their 
ʹvictimʹ required assistance on the part of actors lying outside the borders of the European impasse, able to 
reconcile European countries’ legitimate claims with the declared aim of a peace of magnanimity, as well as 
with Germany’s (that is the continent’s, in Keynes’s view) interests in reconstruction and stability. Adopting 
the model sketched in his 1926 essay against laissez-faire, Keynes was asking Britain and America to act as 
those public-spirited institutions which only are able to promote the general welfare in social worlds 
characterized by complexity and interdependence and threatened by conflicts between particular and 
general interests. The force of the proposal, Keynes claimed, lay in that ʹexpediency and generosity agree 
together, and the policy which will best promote immediate friendship between nations will not conflict 
with the permanent interests of the benefactorʹ (CW 2, p. 179). 
Keynes was convinced of the cruciality of a premise for American generosity: ʹthe financial problems 
which were about to exercise Europe could not be solved by greed. The possibility of their cure lay in 
magnanimity. Europe, if she is to survive her troubles, will need so much magnanimity from America, that 
she must herself practice it. It is useless for the Allies, hot from stripping Germany and one another, to turn 
for help to the United States to put the States of Europe, including Germany, on to their feet againʹ (CW 2, p. 
92). In short, commitment on the part of the European countries to reconstruct Europe rather than continue 
war under other forms was both a result of and a necessary condition for the expected American assistance. 
This amounts to recognizing that the only possibility to escape the troubles of reparations and Inter-Allied 
debts rested on treating them as parts of a unique question and solve them as such: ʹ *t+he settlement of the 
inter-Allied debts is intimately bound up with the reparation settlement. The cancellation of the former 
would be a ground and an excuse for a sensible conclusion of the latter ... It is nearly impossible, in my 
opinion, to settle the one question without the otherʹ (p. 277).  
Hence the urgency of Inter-Allied debts forgiveness as the precondition for the ʹgrand scheme for the 
rehabilitation of Europeʹ (CW 16, p. 428), that is the ʹshared-responsibilitiesʹ plan (stopped by the American 
refusal) of an international loan requiring the whole spectrum of countries involved to participate in the 
reconstruction. In Keynes’s proposal, American assistance to the continent (including Germany’s creditors) 
was conceived as an ignition key allowing a spiral movement of magnanimity to spread along the chain of 
countries disposed to take part in the ʹgrand schemeʹ. Only a gift, acting a ʹstrange attractorʹ, could provide 
the starting engine for this movement towards a more balanced international economy. As perfectly 
expressed by Alvin Gouldner (1973), only a gift as a principle of ʹsomething for nothingʹ as opposed to the 
ʹsomething for somethingʹ of the norm of market reciprocity, is able to provide both the ʹmechanism for 
stopping vicious cycles of social interactionʹ (p. 273) and the ʹignition keyʹ that activates reciprocity, so that 
ʹthe ongoing cycle of mutual exchangeʹ can start up again (275; see Carabelli and Cedrini 2010b). 
 
3. On the practical impossibility of collection 
It is only after discussing the nature and evils of Inter-Allied debts that Keynes recognizes the existence of a 
third motive for their cancellation, namely ʹthe practical impossibility of collectionʹ. The United States was a 
ʹbusiness countryʹ, he wrote in a 1945 memorandum to Chancellor Hugh Dalton during the negotiations of 
the American loan, ʹwhere it is a moral duty and not merely a self-regarding act to make any money which 
the traffic will bear and the law allowʹ, so that ʹsome imitation of a normal banking transaction is necessary if 
the moral principles of the country are not to be affronted. If the elements of a trade are present, the 
American way of life requires that at least the appearance of a trade should emergeʹ (CW 24, p. 548). 
Therefore, the Americans should have been sensible to what he named, in an article of 1921, ʹthe foreign 
trade argumentʹ (CW 17, p. 277).  
In his memorandum ʹThe Treatment of Inter-Ally Debt Arising Out of the Warʹ of March 1919, 
Keynes had warned that ʹ*i+f the loans are to be met, a serious obstacle will exist to future trade relations 
between the Alliesʹ (CW 16, p. 424). Britain should necessarily stimulate exports to the United States and 
imports from the Allies, bitterly opposing trade flows in the opposite direction: ʹtrade must be mainly one 
wayʹ (ib.). Those between the post-war world and the pre-war gold standard order were ʹfalse analogiesʹ (CW 
18, p. 40): Europe, now a debtor, could not rely, in the future, on American loans with a self-liquidating 
character. The practice of foreign investment was ʹonly suited to particular circumstancesʹ wherein an ʹold 
country can (...) develop a new one at a time when the latter could not possibly do so with its own resources 
aloneʹ, so that ʹthe arrangement may be mutually advantageous; and out of abundant profits the lender may 
hope to be repaidʹ (CW 17, p. 274). This time there was ʹno natural increase, no real sinking fund, out of 
which *he+ can be repaidʹ, so that ʹ*t+he unwillingness of American investors to buy European bonds is 
founded in common senseʹ (ib.).  
But this implies that ʹ[i]f [...] the United States were to exact payment of the Allied debts, the position 
would be intolerable. If she persevered to the bitter end, scrapped her export industries, and diverted to 
other uses the capital now employed in them, and if the former European associates decided to meet their 
obligations at whatever cost to themselves, it is not impossible that the final result might be to America’s 
material interest. But the project is utterly chimerical. It will not happen. Nothing is more certain than that 
America will pursue such a policy to the bitter end; she will abandon it as soon as she experiences its first 
consequences. Nor, if she did, would the Allies pay the moneyʹ (CW 17, p. 276). The decisive argument for 
debt cancellation on the part of the United States, therefore, was ʹthe unlikelihood of permanence in the 
exaction of the debts [...] because of the great difficulty of the problem which the United States has before her 
in any case in balancing her commercial account with the Old Worldʹ (CW 3, p. 110).  
In Keynes’s vision, the American position was ʹexactly parallel to that of German reparationʹ (CW 17, 
p. 276): ʹAmerica will not see through the repayment of Allied debt any more than the Allies will see through 
the collection of their present reparations demandsʹ (p. 277). In replying to Mr. Amberson on the moral 
arguments expressed in A London View of War Debts in favour of the cancellation of such debts, Keynes drew 
on this parallel to suggest that Inter-Allied debts and reparations would have produced similar, dreadful 
effects on future creditors-debtors relationships. Significantly, he clarified that he did not ʹconsider that 
America had any ʹobligationʹ to do anything whatever < I do not suggest for a moment that any mitigation 
should be offered by America unconditionallyʹ (CW 18, p. 300). Yet America, in his words, carried ʹa share of 
responsibility which is not negligible for securing a just settlementʹ of reparations (ib.).  
For Keynes, the American view itself of Inter-Allied indebtedness, that is the belief that it could be 
settled on commercial bases, was a logical mistake grounded on false analogies. Not only had war so shaken 
the European system as to reveal the ʹsandy and false foundationʹ (CW 2, p. 1) of its economic organization, 
but the whole ensemble of debt relationships linking the Old World with the New in the pre-1914 order was 
ʹfragile; and it has only survived because its burden on the paying countries has not so far been oppressive, 
because this burden is represented by real assets and is bound up with the property system generally, and 
because the sums already lent are not unduly large in relation to those which it is still hoped to borrowʹ. The 
problem is that bankers ʹare disposed to believe ... by analogy with it, that a comparable system between 
Governments, on a far vaster and definitely oppressive scale, represented by no real assets, and less closely 
associated with the property system, is natural and reasonable and in conformity with human natureʹ (pp. 
178-79).  
On the contrary, ʹthe whole positionʹ of Inter-Allied debts was ʹin the highest degree artificial, 
misleading, and vexatiousʹ (CW 2, p. 178). ʹThe existence of the great war debtsʹ, Keynes argued, thereby 
inaugurating a line of argument based on the parallel between internal and external debt, ʹis a menace to 
financial stability everywhere. There is no European country in which repudiation may not soon become an 
important political issue. In the case of internal debt, however, there are interested parties on both sides, and 
the question is one of the internal distribution of wealth. With external debts this is not so, and the creditor 
nations may soon find their interest inconveniently bound up with the maintenance of a particular type of 
government or economic organization in the debtor countries. Entangling alliances or entangling leagues are 
nothing to the entanglements of cash owingʹ (p. 177). True, the evils of internal debts could be reduced by a 
capital levy, but ʹthe continuance on a huge scale of indebtedness between Governments has special dangers 
of its ownʹ (p. 178). Inter-Allied debts would have imposed ʹa crushing burdenʹ on European Allies, who 
might then be expected to ʹmake constant attempts to evade or escape payments, and these attempts will be 
a constant source of international friction and ill-will for many years to come. A debtor nation does not love 
its creditorʹ (p. 177). 
 
IV. ANTI-SOCIAL ACTS AND POETIC JUSTICE: THE INTERWAR PERIOD 
In a 1925 article on Inter-Allied indebtedness, Keynes remarked that both such debts and the ʹtheoretical 
liabilities of Germany under the treaty of Versaillesʹ were both to be considered as ʹa matter of politics and 
not of law or contractʹ (CW 18, p. 264). Seven years later, on the Daily Mail, he introduced limits to the 
cogency of the ʹsanctity of contractʹ (p. 384) even for liabilities which do not derive from military 
confrontation. The ʹsanctity of contractʹ, he pointed out in general terms, is not ʹan immutable law of natureʹ 
and cannot be preserved ʹexcept by the reasonableness of the creditorʹ (ib.). Britain lacked gold resources to 
repay the WWI American debt; she was therefore forced to ʹbuy lessʹ from America and to make the latter an 
ʹoffer to sell moreʹ, which the Americans respectively saw, in Keynes’s words, as ʹa reprisalʹ and ʹan injuryʹ (p. 
385). Yet he maintained that ʹ[d]ebtors are only honourable in countries where creditors are reasonable. If 
creditors stand on the letter of the law, debtors can usually show them how little the law avails. 
Internationally, contract has nothing to support it except the self-respect and self-interest of the debtor. A 
loan, the claims of which are supported by neither, will not be paid for longʹ (p. 384). Keynes claimed that 
Britain had always acted on such lines: ʹ*t+hough not at first, yet in the coolness of time we have shown that 
we are still reasonable, and that we practice what we preachʹ (ib.). He then went so far as to define it a 
specific ʹduty of the creditor not to frustrate paymentʹ (p. 385): the debtor cannot be asked to renounce its 
ʹself-respect and self-interestʹ – he added, making a clear distinction between the latter and ʹnarrow 
calculations of financial self-interestʹ on the part of the creditor –, which were ʹpowerful motivesʹ with Britain 
to ʹdo our utmost for a friendly and fair settlementʹ (ib.).  
International debt/credit relationships occupy a central position in Keynes’s whole work as an 
international economist engaged in the attempt to construct a ʹsounder political economy between all 
nationsʹ (CW 25, p. 43). During the interwar period, his attention is constantly posed on what he defined, 
thereby establishing a tradition in this regard, as the ʹrules of the gameʹ (CW 20, p. 599) of the gold standard, 
and the explicit aim of his work as an international negotiator in the years of World War II was to produce a 
revolution in the management of the relationships between debtor and creditor countries. The harmonious 
traits of what Keynes considered as a ʹlost paradiseʹ (Dimand 2006, p. 175), that is the pre-war regime 
centered on Britain’s leadership and a mutually advantageous partnership between the old world and the 
new, were to reappear at the beginning of the Forties in the plan for the International Clearing Union (ICU). 
There Keynes points at the pre-war regime as the only recent historical experience of intended and 
successful struggle with the ʹsecular international problem ... of maintaining equilibrium in the balance of 
payments of between countriesʹ (CW 25, p. 21).  
The system worked because ʹspecial influences were present which largely removed the burden of 
pressure, or reversed its direction, as between the debtor country and the creditor or the world at large ... in 
the Victorian age the peculiar organisation in London and to a less extent in Paris, the two main creditor 
centres, by which a flow of gold immediately translated itself, not in the first instance into a change in prices 
and wages, but into a change in the volume of the foreign investment by the creditors, caused the burden to 
be carried by stronger shouldersʹ (CW 25, p. 30). Although in the first phase after the war, funds continued to 
flow from creditor to debtor countries, these were mostly speculative flows, that is they were not destined to 
the development of new resources. Then ʹcomplete degeneration set in and capital funds flowed from 
countries of which the balance of trade was adverse into countries where it was favourableʹ (p. 31). Hence 
Keynes’s proposal for shifting part of the adjustment burden on creditor countries and his position in favour 
of capital controls.  
Already in his 1929 lectures to the Geneva School of International Studies, Keynes had defined 
foreign investment as ʹa process by which rich countries spread the proceeds of their wealth over the world, 
and thus is internationally desirableʹ (in Fleming 2000, p. 142). Yet, he claimed, it could not be supported ʹon 
nationalist groundsʹ (ib.) any longer, since Britain was now a debtor country (which explains why Keynes 
had reversed the position he had held in his 1910 articles on the virtues of Britain’s foreing lending) suffering 
from high efficiency wages and lacking funds and opportunities for domestic investments. In the absence of 
specific arrangements with her creditors, Britain was therefore compelled to a decade of deflation. Gold 
concentration in creditor countries, the United States and France, prevented a smooth international 
adjustment driven by raising prices in debtor countries. Although the total quantity of gold was sufficient, its 
distribution was ʹvery unequalʹ (p. 150), Keynes remarked on proposing to use the newborn Bank for 
International Settlement as a supranational authority gradually replacing gold with an international 
currency.  
In his 1931 Chicago lectures, he pointed out that at the end of the Twenties, when everyone was 
thinking about the return to gold as the means to prosperity, ʹthe United States was a free purchaser of all 
kinds of foreign bonds, good, bad, and indifferent – a free lender for investment purposes, that is to say, to 
the rest of the world. To an important extent the United States was acting, in this generous foreign-loan 
policy, as a conduit pipe for the savings of the more cautious Europeans, who had less confidence in their 
own prosperity than America hadʹ (CW 13, p. 345). Then came dear money, the drain of foreign gold 
resources, the credit crunch with a lowered willingness to buy foreign bonds and finally the speculative 
boom of the stock exchange. ʹFor the last two yearsʹ, he explained in an article on the ʹGreat Slump of 1930ʹ, 
ʹtwo out of the three principal creditor nations of the world, namely, France and the United States, have 
largely withdrawn their resources from the international market for long-term loansʹ (CW 9, p. 132). On the 
eve of the 1931 sterling crisis, Keynes explicitly attacked them: ʹ*i+t cannot and will not work the 
international gold standard if the other creditor countries do not play the r̒ules of the game ̉ ʹ (CW 20, p. 599). 
ʹThe whole world is heartily sick of the selfishness and folly with which the international gold standard is 
being worked. Instead of being a means of facilitating international trade, the gold standard has become a 
curse laid upon the economic life of the worldʹ (p. 600). 
America and France were not lending ʹtheir surplus balance on international account as Great Britain 
used to do in the pastʹ (CW 20, p. 600). ʹFranceʹ, Keynes argued, ʹappears to have employed virtually the 
whole of her international surplus during the last three or four years in the purchase of gold and short-term 
liquid claims instead of embarking on long-term investment abroad. The attitude towards long-term foreign 
investments of investors in the United States has varied but has been generally unfavourable, except in 
period of boom when American issuing houses have lost their headsʹ (ib.). To describe ʹthe game from the 
point of view of the debtor countriesʹ (p. 601), Keynes quoted a passage of the report of the Macmillan 
Committee, after pointing out that the only use of gold reserve was ʹas a medium for meeting a deficit on the 
balance of international payments until steps have been taken to bring it again to equilibriumʹ: ʹ[i]t is usually 
beyond *debtor countries’+ power to adjust their balance of payments so rapidly and completely as to permit 
a complete cessation of borrowing: yet, in so far as they export gold, their credit as borrowers suffers. Thus, 
having lost their gold and not being able to borrow, they are forced off the gold standard ʹ (ib.). Keynes 
bitterly concluded that ʹ[w]e must make it plain to our friends on the gold standard that, if they refuse to 
play the game according to the rules, this is not to be made a compelling reason for reducing the standard of 
life in this country for a generationʹ (ib.). 
Only a reasonable distribution of loans for capital development among the three financial centres, he 
had argued in his Chicago lectures, and accrued absorption of foreign loans on the part of New York and 
Paris, could produce the required ʹlarge new creation of international credit which would tend to support 
commodity prices and stimulate international tradeʹ (CW 20, p. 347). After the sterling crisis, Keynes 
explicitly called for a gold conference. His suggestion might have been a ʹcover, for he had become 
convinced of the inevitability of devaluation in the near futureʹ (Moggridge 1992, p. 526). Having in mind the 
interests of the system as a whole, Keynes described domestic measures to improve the balance of trade as 
definitely second-best policies, which ʹnot only do nothing helpful to the outside world but may actually be 
injuriousʹ (CW 20, pp. 613-14) and make it ʹstill more difficult for debtor countries to meet their obligationsʹ 
(p. 614). Yet he saw in sterling’s devaluation, le fait accompli, a chance to conciliate national and global 
interests, as long as this measure had an international, public-spirited nature, and could serve as a cure for 
the international disease of an interdependent economic world populated by countries unwilling (creditors) 
or unable (debtors) to follow the rules of the game.  
Keynes’s conference to the International Economic Society of Hamburg (January 8, 1932) focused on 
the international ʹcompetitive struggle for liquidityʹ (CW 21, p. 40), which he described as ʹan extreme 
example of the disharmony of general and particular interestʹ (p. 52). Each government was trying ʹto make 
its international balance sheet more liquid by restricting imports and stimulating exports by every possible 
means, the success of each one in this direction meaning the defeat of someone else. Moreover every country 
tries to stop capital development within its own borders for fear of the effect on its international balance. Yet 
it will only be successful in its objects in so far as its progress towards negation is greater than that of its 
neighboursʹ (p. 40). The problem was ʹmainly internationalʹ and required an ʹinternational cureʹ: ʹthe 
leadership of Great Britainʹ. She only could, to the ʹgeneral advantageʹ (p. 57), ʹresume the vacant financial 
leadership of the world, which no one else has the experience or the public spirit to occupy, speaking out of 
acknowledged strength and not out of weaknessʹ (CW 9, pp. 235-36).  
Once regained her power of initiative, Britain should have used it ʹwithout hesitation or delay for 
expanding purchasing power ourselves and for helping others to expand. We must set the exampleʹ (CW 21, 
p. 62). He proudly claimed that ʹthe possession of a large amount of gold will be no handicap later on when 
we are considering conversion schemes and large-scale international financial assistance. The gold will be 
more fruitful in our hands than in France or the United Statesʹ (p. 81). After sterling’s devaluation, he wrote 
in his article The Future of the World of September 1931, Britain could finally play ʹthe part of a reasonable 
creditor who moderates his claim in view of so great a change in the situation as the recent catastrophic fall 
in commodity pricesʹ (CW 9, p. 247). Countries following Britain’s example would have benefited of higher 
prices, but – the passage is worth quoting in full – ʹnone of us will secure a competitive advantage at the 
expenses of the others. Thus the competitive disadvantage will be concentrated on those few countries which 
remain in the gold standard. On these will fall the curse of Midas. As a result of their unwillingness to 
exchange their exports except for gold their trade exports will dry up and disappear until they no longer 
have any either a favourable trade balance or foreign deposits to repatriate. This means in the main France 
and the United States. Their loss of export trade will be an inevitable, a predictable, outcome of their action. 
These countries largely for reasons resulting from the war and the war settlements, are owed much money 
by the rest of the world. They erect tariff barriers which prevent the payment of these sums in good. They 
are unwilling to lend it. They have already taken nearly all the available surplus gold in the whole world. 
There remained, in logic, only one way by which the rest of the world could maintain its solvency and self-
respect; namely, to cease purchasing these countries’ exports. So long as the gold standard is preserved – 
which means that the prices of international commodities must be much the same everywhere – this 
involved a competitive campaign of deflation, each of us trying to get our prices down faster than the others, 
a campaign which had intensified unemployment and business losses to unendurable pitchʹ (p. 248).  
In Hamburg, Keynes had gone so far as to define ʹ[t]he undermining of the competitive position of 
the export industries of [the] gold countriesʹ as a ʹresponse to their own request; – or, at any rate a case of 
poetic justiceʹ (CW 21, p. 45). By ʹ[e]xercising deflationary pressure on the rest of the world by having a net 
creditor position which causes them to draw goldʹ (p. 44), France and the United States were directly 
responsible for the ʹcessation of the international lending which had been off-setting the disequilibrium of 
the balances of payment between countries which War debts and tariffs would have already produced 
otherwiseʹ (p. 212). They could therefore be assimilated to ʹan individual or an institution or a public body, 
which voluntarily and unnecessarily curtails or postpones expenditure which is admittedly useful, [thus] 
performing an anti-social actʹ (p. 53), whereas it was ʹa high social duty today for everyone to use his 
influence, whatever it may be, in private and in public, in favour of every kind of expansion and 
expenditure, which is financially possible to those who incur in it, and which in better terms would be 
generally admitted to be legitimate and usefulʹ (p. 60). Creditor countries, on the contrary, believed ʹ[t]heir 
own accumulations [to be] the reward of virtue, and the losses which the rest of us have suffered ... the 
penalty of imprudenceʹ (ib.). In his Reflections on the Sterling Exchange of April 1932, Keynes exposed a 
ʹphilosophic reflection on these mattersʹ which included the telling of the story of ʹa Senator from the Middle 
West who cried in a loud voice to Europe: ̀We do not want your goods. We will not have your bonds. We 
have already got your gold. What we want is your money ̉. The Senator may be mythical, but there still 
remained a logical alternative left to Europe which he overlooked, namely, for the rest of the world to get on 
as best it can without buying the exports of those countries which have an unbalanced creditor positionʹ (p. 
78).  
Keynes knew that ʹthe solution to which we have been drivenʹ was ʹunsatisfactory for everyoneʹ, 
since the world needed a trade recovery in the united States, but was doubtful about the possibility that the 
gold standard countries could ʹlearn the terms, which must needs be strict, on which we should be prepared 
to re-enter the system of a drastically reformed gold standardʹ (CW 9, p. 249), or that they could provide 
ʹdirect relief of financial tension between nationsʹ (CW 21, p. 214). As he remarked on occasion of the 1933 
World Economic Conference, ʹ*t+his kind of philanthropy will never be large enough in scale; the division of 
the burden will never be rightly agreed; nor will the division of the proceedsʹ, all the more so since ʹ*f+or 
several years we have been trying to buy ourselves out of the mess by such means, and our attempts are a 
proved failure. One chance there was – at Paris in 1919, when a loan of reconstruction might have been part 
of a general plan for the world’s appeasement; but that we blindly rejectedʹ (p. 215).  
 
V. CREDITORS, DEBTORS AND RENTIERS 
Reading the interwar period ʹin terms of Keynes’s theoryʹ, Skidelsky claims that ʹthe much greater 
uncertainty arising from unsettled conditions after the First World War had brought about a big increase in 
liquidity preference, whose international expression was the hoarding rather than spending of reservesʹ 
(2009, p. 180). The hypothesis of continuity between Keynes’s analysis of individual behaviour in domestic 
economies and his view of political economy between countries in the international setting   is quite 
reasonable. According to De Cecco (2001), in the ʹHistorical Illustrationsʹ of A Treatise on Money Keynes had 
come to construct a vision of economic history as an eternal conflict between debtors and creditors, a vision 
later embodied in the theory of liquidity preference. In the Treatise, debtors and creditors correspond 
respectively to ʹentrepreneurs engaged in profits-seeking activities, demiurges of social welfare, and rentiers 
whose unique interest is to find the most liquid assets for holding their financial resources, so as to be able to 
stop hoarding and start lending as rapidly as possible when the occasion comesʹ (p. 379; our translation). But 
the whole economic analysis of Keynes ʹlargely consists of working out the consequences for the whole 
economic system of the interactions of these three interest groups, or classes [entrepreneurs, workers and 
rentiers], and in particular the two most important ones, entrepreneurs and financial rentiersʹ (De Cecco 
1990, p. 182). 
In The End of Laissez-Faire, Keynes holds that ʹ[t]he world is not so governed (...) that private and 
social interest always coincide .... It is not a correct deduction from the principles of economics that 
enlightened self-interest always operates in the public interest. Nor is it true that self-interest generally is 
enlightened ... Experience does not show that individuals, when they make up a social unit, are always less 
clear-sighted than whey they act separatelyʹ (CW 9, pp. 287-88). A major reason why private and social 
interest may not coincide is to be found in that society is made of different socioeconomic classes – the 
investing class, the business class, and the earning class, according to the scheme exposed in The Monetary 
Reform – and that ʹsuch a division corresponds to a social cleavage and an actual divergence of interestʹ (CW 
4, p. 4).  
 Individual capitalism before the war, Keynes wrote in The Economic Consequences of the Peace, was 
based on a certain ʹpsychology of societyʹ, which was ʹso framed as to throw a great part of the increased 
income into the control of the class least likely to consume itʹ and, as a consequence, to make it possible ʹto 
secure the maximum accumulation of capitalʹ (CW 2, p. 11). The highly inequal distribution of wealth which 
resulted was thus functional to the general interest, since the rich ʹheld narrower ends in prospectsʹ (ib.). But 
the system was founded on  ʹdouble bluffʹ: both the labouring and the capitalist classes, whether voluntarily 
or not, were subject to the Puritan ʹduty of savingʹ, to a principle of ʹnon-consumption of the cakeʹ (p. 12). 
Disclosing the ʹpossibility of consumption to all and the vanity of abstinence to manyʹ (p. 13), the war 
revealed the bluff, and income inequality became a major social problem. Keynes believed the passing from 
old-style proprietary capitalism to the dominance of big corporations and the separation between ownership 
and management to be responsible for the emergence of a new group of ʹfinancial investorsʹ whose interests 
are ʹpartly divergentʹ with respect to those of ʹbusiness menʹ (CW 4, p. 5), that is ʹthe active and constructive 
element in the whole capitalist societyʹ (CW 2, p. 149).  
Hence the occurrence of two dichotomies in capitalist institutions (see Elliott and Jensen 1997): that 
between ʹindustryʹ and ʹfinanceʹ and the one between ʹspeculationʹ and ʹenterpriseʹ, dychotomies used by 
Keynes in the General Theory to support the ʹthree major components of his argumentarium: the demand for 
and supply of money, and thereby the rate of interest; the expected rate of profit and thereby the volume of 
investment; and the propensity to consumeʹ (ib., p. 107). As to the first, speculative demand for money in 
Keynes’s theory is typical of rentiers, whereas industry requires money for motives of transactions and 
precaution. As to the second, entrepreneurs in former times ʹembarked on business as a way of life, not really 
relying on a precise calculation of prospective profitsʹ, and investment decisions were ʹlargely irrevocable, 
not only for the community as a whole, but also for the individualʹ (CW 7, pp. 150-51). With the advent of 
purely financial speculation, conversely, the capital development of the country is transformed into the 
ʹbyproduct of the activities of a casinoʹ (p. 159). Finally, the consumption decisions of a wealth-owner are 
based on ʹunforeseen changes in the money value of the money-value of its wealthʹ (p. 93), which often 
results in the working class suffering from involuntary unemployment.  
In Keynes’s economics, ʹ*r+entiers’ basic craving for satisfactionʹ materializes ʹin a desire to obtain 
financial gains, not through production, but through the speculative demand for or placement of liquid 
fundsʹ (Elliott and Jensen 1997, p. 110). In Keynes’s liquidity preference theory, the reason why ʹanyone 
outside a lunatic asylum [should] wish to use money as a store of wealthʹ (CW 14, pp. 115-16) is that ʹthe 
possession of actual money lulls our disquietude, and the premium which we require to make us part with 
money is the measure of our disquietudeʹ (p. 116). Occupied with ʹforeseeing changes in the conventional 
basis of valuation a short time ahead of the general publicʹ (CW 7, p. 154), financial investors and speculators 
operating in a context of ʹdimmedʹ animal spirits and pessimism produce a state of affairs which induces 
rentiers to ʹprefer the control of liquid cash to parting with it in exchange for a debt on the terms indicated by 
the market rate of interestʹ (pp. 205-206). Rentiers may thus be willing to lend uniquely at a rate which 
exceeds the marginal efficiency of capital, thereby discouraging entrepreneurs from ʹcalling ʹto the aid of 
their enterprisesʹ the wealth of the rentiersʹ (Elliott and Jensen 1997, p. 112).  
Elliott and Jensen identify three main criticisms of the rentier-like attitude in Keynes’s economics. 
First (for convenience, the ʹdemand for moneyʹ criticism), by controlling the speculative demand for money 
and, as a result, by affecting the interest rate, rentiers ʹare in a strategic position to dominate and to take 
advantage of entrepreneurs and workersʹ (p. 113). An increase in the demand for money produced by a 
larger liquidity premium between money and goods necessarily produces a decrease in the demand for 
goods and labour: ʹin short, the demand for money is not a demand for goods or to employ labourʹ (ib.). A 
second criticism (ʹdead handʹ) is related to Keynes’s preference for inflation over deflation, which rests on the 
view that ʹit is worse, in an impoverished world, to provoke unemployment than to disappoint the rentierʹ 
(CW 4, p. 36). Inflation decreases the burden of debt and ʹemancipatesʹ debtors ʹfrom the dead hand *of+ the 
pastʹ (p. 9), as Keynes explained in The Monetary Reform. Finally, Keynes sees literally no function at all in the 
rentiers’ activity (ʹfunctionless investorʹ). This rests solely on the scarcity of capital, which Keynes considers 
not a natural feature of a market economy but a purely artificial one (see Carabelli and De Vecchi 1999). 
Contrary to natural resources, in fact, the use of capital does not bring about ʹa genuine sacrifice which could 
only be called forth by the offer of a reward in the shape of interestʹ (CW 7, p. 376). The scarcity of capital is 
rather the ʹreflection in economic terms of the fact that in a market economy the motivation of money for 
money’s sake has, over time, reached a particular high level in the scale of valuesʹ (Carabelli and De Vecchi 
1999, p. 281). 
The two dichotomies cited above and Keynes’s ʹmixture of scorn and hostility for the rentiersʹ 
(Meltzer 1989, p. 5) are not extraneous to the latter’s portrayal of the international society as the historically 
contingent result of a perpetual struggle between debtor and creditor countries. In particular, both in the 
aftermath of World War I and in the interwar period, Keynes attributes to creditor countries those same 
faults he ascribes to rentiers in his analysis of domestic capitalism. The central message of The Economic 
Consequences of the Peace is that Inter-Allied debts could not but impose their ʹcrashing burdenʹ on the fragile 
economic organisation of a distressed and ruined Europe, all the more so in a context of structurally 
unbalanced relationships between the continent and America – so that, Keynes wrote in 1921, ʹthe restoration 
of some equilibrium must be a chief problem of the near future, politically as well as economicallyʹ (CW 17, 
p. 273). Neither Germany – ʹnations are not authorised, by religion or by natural morals, to visit on the 
children of their enemies the misdoings of parents or of rulersʹ (CW 2, p. 222) – nor Europe – she ʹmust 
depend in the long run on her own daily labor and not on the largesse of America; but, on the other hand, 
she will not pinch herself in order that the fruit of her daily labor may go elsewhereʹ (CW 16, p. 427) – will 
ʹdie quietlyʹ (CW 2, p. 144) under the ʹdead handʹ of the past.  
The rentier-like attitude of the United States in particular is easily detectable, as seen, in Keynes’s 
criticism of the American view of debts as business investments. In an article of August 1923, he calculated 
the opportunity cost of Britain’s American debt and emphasized the cost of thinking in terms of ʹdemand for 
moneyʹ and ʹdemand for goods or to employ labourʹ: ʹWe shall be paying to the United States each year for 
sixty years a sum equivalent to two-thirds the cost of our Navy, nearly equal to the State expenditure on 
education, more than the total burden of our pre-war debt, more than the total profits of the whole of our 
mercantile marine and the whole of our mines together. With these sums we could endow and splendidly 
house every month for sixty years one university, one hospital, one institute of research, etcetera, etcetera. 
With an equal sacrifice over an equal period we could abolish slums and rehouse in comfort the half of our 
population which is now inadequately shelteredʹ (CW 18, p. 194).  
Keynes’s criticism of the international rentier as a functionless investor is implicit in the anti-
utilitarian philosophy which underlies his economic diplomacy. In his methodological manifesto – the 
exchange with Roy Harrod concerning the latter’s Scope and Method in Economics – Keynes defines economics 
as ʹa branch of logic, a way of thinking ... in terms of models joined to the art of choosing models which are 
relevant to the contemporary worldʹ (CW 14, p. 296). For Keynes, the object of economic analysis is in fact 
ʹnot to provide a machine, or method of blind manipulation, which will furnish an infallible answer, but to 
provide ourselves with an organised and orderly method of thinking out particular problemsʹ (CW 7, p. 297). 
In short, Keynes believes economics to be not a natural science relying on positivistic methods, but a method 
that helps economists to draw logically correct conclusions, that is to avoid logical fallacies in reasoning such 
as the fallacy of composition. Economics is even ʹcompelledʹ to be a branch of logic rather than a natural 
science à la Robbins, since ʹthe material which it is applied to is, in too many respects, not homogeneous 
through timeʹ (CW 14, p. 296). As it is the case with probability (the Treatise on Probability is de facto Keynes’s 
ʹessay on methodʹ: see Carabelli 1988), the economic material possesses attributes of complexity which 
should compel the economist to reject the blind application of mathematics and statistics, as well as of their 
assumptions of homogeneity, atomism and independence, to an object that is essentially vague and 
indeterminate, not homogeneous, not divisible in homogeneous independent parts, non finite, and 
characterised by organic interdependence. Moreover, Keynes emphasizes that economics is a ʹmoral scienceʹ 
which employs ʹintrospection and judgements of valueʹ (CW 14, p. 297), and has to deal with changing 
factors as ʹmotives, expectations, psychological uncertaintiesʹ (ib.), that is ʹwith human beings in their social 
environmentʹ (Marchionatti 2010, p. 131).  
It should not comes as a surprise, therefore, that ʹeconomics and ethics are close companions in 
Keynes’s intellectual frameworkʹ (O’Donnell 1989, p. 164). But to Keynes, ʹthe role of economics was that of 
service to the higher discipline of ethicsʹ (ib.). In ethics, Keynes distinguishes between ʹspeculative ethicsʹ, 
that is ʹone’s attitude towards oneself and the ultimateʹ, and ʹpractical ethicsʹ, or ʹone’s attitude towards the 
outside world and the intermediateʹ (CW 10, p. 436); ʹ*t+he first is the rational analysis of the ultimate aims of 
human action, and the second covers politics and economics, which, being at the service of ethics, analyse 
and discuss ways of building an ‘ethically rational society’ʹ (Carabelli and De Vecchi 1999, p. 279). 
Speculative ethics concerns ultimate ends and values of human action whose nature is intrinsically good: 
following George Edward Moore, the author of Principia Ethica, Keynes stresses that some general and 
abstract moral ends such as love, friendship, beauty, truth, and knowledge, are universally intrinsically 
desirable and ought to be pursued in any time and circumstance. Practical ethics is the domain of politics 
and economics, and include probability, uncertainty and action as well. Since practical ethics is directed 
towards the construction of an ethically rational society, the ends of economics and politics are neither 
absolute nor universally valid: rather, they act as necessary prerequisites for social progress and the 
attainment of increasingly higher levels of goodness. Practical ethics, says Keynes in a youth paper entitled 
Miscellanea Ethica (1905), is concerned ʹwith conduct: it would investigate the difficult questions of the 
probable grounds of actions, and the curious connection between ‘probable’ and ‘ought’: and it would 
endeavour to formulate or rather to investigate existing general maxims, bearing in mind their strict 
relativity to particular circumstancesʹ (ib.).  
Keynes’s ethics is, in line with Aristotle, an ethics of virtues (see Helburn 1992; Carabelli 1998), 
which is concerned with the whole conduct of human life: not only with single actions and related moral 
duties, but with the whole texture of the character from which the act flows, with motives and intentions, 
and even reactive feelings and emotions. Keynes believes, in agreement with ancient ethics, that the good life 
has necessary material and institutional necessary conditions: human flourishing requires material 
prerequisites. The task of political economy as a moral science is therefore to him precisely to supply these 
material conditions as necessary preconditions for the good and happy life (see Carabelli and Cedrini 2009). 
Keynes’s philosophy was fully anti-utilitarian. In his 1938 autobiographical sketch My Early Beliefs, 
he defined ʹthe Benthamite tradition ... as the worm which has been gnawing at the insides of modern 
civilisation and is responsible for moral decayʹ (CW 10, p. 445). Already in December 1925, Keynes had 
written some notes on the love for money attacking the ʹtest of money measurement [which] constantly tends 
to widen the area where we weigh concrete goods against abstract moneyʹ, the ʹsanctification of savingʹ and 
the tendency to ʹsacrifice the present to the futureʹ without being sure that the exchange is worth while (in 
Skidelsky 1992, p. 21). In the famous essay The Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren, Keynes argues that 
ʹthe economic problemʹ - ʹthe problem of want and poverty and the economic struggle between classes and 
nationsʹ (CW 9, p. xvii) - ʹmay be solved, or be at least within sight of solution, within a hundred yearsʹ, so 
that it would be wrong to define it as ʹthe permanent problem of the human raceʹ (p. 326). The essay is a 
violent criticism of the ʹold Adamʹ and human ʹpurposivenessʹ (p. 329), that is our being ʹmore concerned 
with the remote future results of our actions than with their own quality or their immediate effects on our 
own environmentʹ (pp. 329-20). With the end of the economic problem – ʹthe western world already has the 
resources and the technique, if we could create the organisation to use them, capable of reducing the 
economic problem, which now absorbs our moral and material energies, to a position of secondary 
importanceʹ (p. xvii)– man will be ʹless preoccupied with accumulation of wealthʹ (p. 331) and be free to deal 
with his ʹreal problems – the problems of life and of human relations, of creation and behaviour and religionʹ 
(CW IX: xvii). Once material wealth is ʹno longer of high social importance, there will be great changes in the 
code of morals ... We shall be able to afford to dare to assess the money-motive at its true value. The love of 
money as a possession – as distinguished from the love of money as a means to the enjoyments and realities 
of life – will be recognised for what it is, a somewhat disgusting morbidity, one of those semicriminal, semi-
pathological propensities which one hands over with a shudder to the specialists in mental diseaseʹ. ʹWe 
shallʹ, he concluded, ʹonce more value ends above means and prefer the good to the usefulʹ (ib.).  
As seen, Keynes treated war debts as ʹa case of pure usuryʹ, and saw the ʹcommon causeʹ against 
Germany, in Mooreian terms, as an ultimate good. Friends should not treat each other instrumentally, since 
friendship requires fairness of treatment. But the ʹfunctionless investorʹ, who demands money rather than 
goods, is also the main issue at stake in Keynes’s criticism of creditor countries in the interwar period, as it is 
immediately evident from the use of the allegory of ʹa Senator from the Middle West, who cried in a loud 
voice to Europe: ʹWe do not want your goods. We will not have your bonds. We have already got your gold. 
What we want is your moneyʹʹ (CW 21, p. 78). The analogy between domestic and international rentiers was 
explicit and complete: Keynes directly attributed the economic catastrophe of the Thirties, which he 
described as an example of extreme ʹdisharmony of general and particular interestʹ of the kind of those 
engendered by the conflict between productive and unproductive classes, to the ʹanti-socialʹ behaviour of 
international rentiers. ʹWhat the traditional view called ʹsavingsʹ Keynes saw as ʹhoardingʹʹ (Dillard 1946, p. 
216), also at the international level. The rentier had completely lost her/his function: international 
disequilibrium was due to the creditors’ unwillingness to lend their surplus, ʹas Great Britain used to do in 
the pastʹ, to the benefit of global multilateralism.  
Moreover, by pointing at the ʹcompetitive struggle for liquidityʹ, Keynes laid down the foundations 
of the General Theory. In A Treatise on Money, Keynes’s vision of economic history as a permanent conflict 
between debtors and creditors is supplemented by the awareness of a true ʹdilemma of the international 
systemʹ, that is the double need ʹto preserve the advantages of the stability of the local currencies of the 
various members of the system in terms of the international standard, and to preserve at the same time an 
adequate local autonomy for each member over its domestic rate of interest and its volume of foreign 
lendingʹ (CW 6, p. 272). In short, Keynes sees international discipline (as regards exchange rates and capital 
movements), one the one side, and domestic autonomy (as regards policy to attain and maintain full 
employment), on the other, as two competing interests potentially destined to clash one against the other, as 
the Thirties were to show. The ʹcase of poetic justiceʹ against irresponsible creditor countries had brought 
protectionism to the attention of Keynes, who had come to invoke self-sufficiency and the nationalisation of 
finance, to the extent that the only chapter of The General Theory explicitly dealing with international 
economic relations includes a rediscovery of mercantilism.  
In that chapter, Keynes indirectly shows where to search for a national behaviour which can lie in 
harmony with the interests of the system (see Moggridge 1986), thereby solving the dilemma of the 
international system. Keynes stated that in the absence of alternative methods of controlling the national 
inducement to invest, a country would be right in attempting to reach and maintain a favourable balance of 
trade, since the latter is the only direct means available for increasing foreign investment and the only 
indirect means of reducing the domestic interest rate (which is otherwise governed by liquidity preference 
and money supply). Significantly, Keynes used Heckscher’s expression ʹfear of goodsʹ (CW 7, p. 347), which 
much resembles the rentier’s demand for money rather than for goods. He also described the virtues of 
mercantilists’ attempt to get rid of an unwelcome surplus of goods – which might produce unemployment – 
and to increase the domestic stock of money with a view to reducing interest rates. To advocate laissez-faire 
in a gold standard regime is patently absurd, Keynes asserted: for if the rate of interest and the money 
supply are primarily determined by the balance of payments, ʹthere is no orthodox means open to the 
authorities for countering unemployment at home except by struggling for an export surplus and an import 
of monetary metal at the expense of their neighbourʹ (pp. 348-49).  
Yet, if ʹdomestic prosperity *is+ directly dependent on a competitive pursuit of markets and a 
competitive appetite for the precious metalsʹ (CW 7, p. 349) and gold supplies are insufficiently abundant, 
international trade is destined to become what it had been in the early Thirties, that is ʹa desperate expedient 
to maintain employment at home by forcing sales on foreign markets and restricting purchases, which, if 
successful, will merely shift the problem of unemployment to the neighbour which is worsted in the 
struggleʹ (pp. 382-83). True, in the General Theory Keynes looks at international economic relations from the 
point of view of a single country engaged in the competitive struggle for liquidity, to the extent that the only 
concrete solution to the impasse is seen, once again, in Britain’s playing the role of a ʹreasonable creditorʹ, one 
who neither frustrates payment nor sacrifices the debtor’s self-respect and self-interest to narrow 
calculations of financial self-interest. A creditor, in other words, who feels less fear of goods than the two 
international rentiers and promises to ʹsecure for *her+self no larger a share of the stock of the precious 
metals than is fair and reasonableʹ (p. 338), so as to ʹleave room for the international division of labour and 
for international lending in appropriate conditionsʹ (p. 382). Yet the adjustment burden would have fallen on 
the system’s irresponsible creditors; though an act of poetic justice, Keynes knew that ʹ*t+he world will never 
be prosperous without a trade recovery in the United States. Peace and confidence and a harmonious 
economic equilibrium for all the closely interrelated countries of the globe is the only goal worth aiming atʹ 
(CW 9, p. 249).  
  
VI. EUTHANASIA OF RENTIER COUNTRIES: THE INTERNATIONAL CLEARING UNION 
The story of the planning of Keynes’s schemes for global reform intertwines with that of his attempts to 
secure American financial assistance to the new alliance against Germany. It is in a 1939 memorandum 
destined (but never sent) to President Roosevelt, that Keynes endeavours to establish a principle of ʹcommon 
causeʹ for the new financial arrangements between the Allies. His suggestion to the ʹFour empiresʹ was to 
establish a ʹjoint purchasing board for the proper regulation of prices and profitsʹ (CW 22, p. 26) based on a 
structure of interest-free credits; America’s credits should not be repayable, he added, for they ʹshould 
constitute a part of the contribution of the United States to the post-war reconstruction of Europeʹ: ʹ*t+his 
time it must be clear from the beginning that the indemnity is paid by the victor to the vanquishedʹ (p. 27). In 
asking the United States to support such a plan of ʹunprecedented generosityʹ (p. 28) – words Keynes directly 
borrowed, as seen, from the ʹEconomic Consequences of the Peaceʹ – and to provide further gold resources as 
a ʹmeasure of responsibility ... for the terms of peaceʹ (ib.), to be used as bank reserves in the countries to be 
reconstructed, Keynes branded the existent American gold stock as ʹlunaticʹ (and ʹredundantʹ), a term he had 
already employed to qualify reserves accumulation in the United States in the interwar period, as well as to 
stigmatize rentiers’ interest in holding money as a store of value.  
As to Allied exchange policy, Britain in particular should act – here Keynes was quoting from his 
plans for the 1933 World Economic Conference – ʹon spectacular lines with the object < of striking the 
imagination of the world and of promoting confidence as well as securing resourcesʹ (CW 22, p. 173). The 
area should sign an international monetary and clearing agreement supplemented by uniform exchange and 
trade controls to protect itself from financial distress. Keynes believed his proposal to be ʹso clothed and 
represented as to be actually palatable and preferable to the American authoritiesʹ. With respect to the last 
war, the proposal had ʹthe great advantage from their point of view that the measure of their financial 
assistance would be closely linked to their own exportsʹ (p. 171). The clearing agreement would have 
abolished all loan transactions between the Allies. British assistance in goods and munitions to France would 
have been conceded as ʹa free giftʹ, thereby creating a precedent ʹif and when the day comes for American 
participationʹ (ib.). To sum up, as he wrote to the Chancellor of the Exchequer on 11 June 1940, this time 
ʹ[t]here shall be no question, as there was last time, of one Ally owing large sums to the other. All is freely 
given for the common cause now and hereafterʹ (p. 177), with the aim of ʹtrascend[ing] financial 
particularitiesʹ (p. 180).  
The plan never saw the light. In deciding for assistance ʹon a commercial basisʹ, establishing financial 
relations ʹon false commercial analogiesʹ (CW 23, p. 25), America should not ʹoverlook the effect of what they 
may do on the post-war equilibrium of international tradeʹ (p. 18). Likely a debtor since 1942 (Keynes was 
writing in October 1940), Britain would be compelled to establish ʹa system of very strict bilateral agreements 
which would tie up the payment for our imports and our foreign debts with the acceptance of our exports by 
the other countryʹ (p. 19). More in general, Keynes believed that the two nations should regard the 
arrangements of credits under the light of what they feel to be ʹthe right and proper thing ... exactly 
appropriate to the interests and responsibility of each and to the true character of the historical events in 
which we are participatingʹ (p. 20). His conclusion was that ʹthe money involved is not of such importance to 
either party compared with the establishment of right relations, which will not lead to subsequent friction 
and estrangement, between the two countriesʹ (ib.). Keynes went on to explain that his remarks about 
American financial assistance to Britain during the war should be considered in a much broader perspective, 
that of the international monetary system. ʹThe U.S.A. already hold the greater part of the gold in the world. 
The only value of gold is as a means of settling international balances. If the convention – for it is no more – 
by which gold is used for this purpose comes to an end, the U.S. Stock of gold becomes valueless. But the 
convention depends on not all the gold being in one hand. When in the game of ʹBeggar my Neighbourʹ all 
the cards belong to one player, that is the signal for the game to come to an end. The pack becomes worthless 
paste-board; the fun is overʹ (25-26). 
These considerations lie, exactly as Keynes’s appreciation of the clearing principle, at the basis of the 
project of an International Clearing Union, which Keynes was to launch in late 1941. In his proposals to 
counter the German plan (June 1940) for a ʹNew Orderʹ for post-war European economy, he stressed that the 
Allies, ʹall members of one familyʹ, had a supreme duty ʹto make our business, above most other purposes, to 
prevent the starvation of the post-armistice period, the currency disorders throughout Europe and the wild 
fluctuations of employment, markets and prices which were the cause of so much misery in the twenty years 
between the two wars; and we shall see to it that this shall be compatible with the proper liberty of each 
country over its own economic fortunesʹ (CW 25, p. 11). The Nazi plan had the merit of attempting to get rid 
of those ʹlaissez-faire currency arrangements whereby a country could be bankrupted, not because it lacked 
exportable goods, but merely because it lacked goldʹ: international trade should have rather consisted in 
ʹtrading goods against goodsʹ, with gold confined to its function as ʹcentral reserve and a means of 
international settlementʹ (p. 12). This required multilateral clearing of trade balances (so as to leave each 
country free to purchase from any other country within the agreement) with fixed but adjustable exchange 
rates. Shocking as it may have seemed at the time, Keynes’s ideal system was quite close to the German 
scheme; only, the leadership of democratic Britain should have replaced Germany in creating ʹa post-war 
order which seeks no particularistic advantageʹ (pp. 14-15).  
What Keynes found to be revolutionary in the ʹSchachtian deviceʹ was certainly the clearing 
principle which lay at the basis of the system of bilateral agreements established by Hjalmar Schacht, Hitler’s 
Minister of Economics between 1934 and 1937, with European and Latin American countries to conduct 
trade without foreign exchange, as an international barter centered on Berlin. Keynes appreciated that the 
system avoids imposing undue pressures on debtor countries, and prevents undesired capital flows from 
debtor to creditor nations. Schachtianism appeared in Keynes’s list of ʹintensive laboratory experiment[s]ʹ 
(CW 25, p. 22) tested during the interwar period in response to the secular international problem, and 
Keynes went so far as to  hope that the system of the future would be a ʹrefinement and improvement of the 
Schachtian deviceʹ (p. 24). Mini (1994) is right to stress first that Keynes’s Schachtian plans were meant for a 
world left alone by the United States – after all, ʹKeynes’s 1941 visit to the US left him deeply pessimistic as 
to the ability of that country to play anything other than a destabilizing role in the international economyʹ 
(Moggridge 2002, p. 118). Nevertheless, the system had two specific advantages: ʹfirst, it substituted human 
intelligence for the failed automatisms of the pastʹ (Mini 2006, p. 6). This could but please the author of 
Indian Currency and Finance, who had suggested to transform the unintended evolution of the Indian 
monetary regime towards a gold exchange standard into the ideal European currency system of the future, 
and of the Monetary Reform, where Keynes wrote that the alternative to gold was just ʹour existing system, 
but worked self-consciously and for a wise, deliberate purposeʹ (CW 4, p. 161). Second, the system ʹleft any 
nation free to pursue its domestic policies without foreign interferences: never again should gold be allowed 
to rule the destinies of nations ... This demanded unlocking nations from each others' embrace, and this 
required jettisoning the gold standard and any other gold substitute that gave creditor nations the upper 
handʹ (Mini 2006, pp. 6-7). 
In fact, the only possibility to build a new international system able to combine ʹeconomic efficiency, 
social justice and individual freedomʹ – the difficulty to mix these three elements, says Keynes in Liberalism 
and Labour, is the ʹpolitical problem of mankindʹ (CW 9, p. 311; see Backhouse and Bateman 2009) – was to 
ground it on a principle of ʹcommon causeʹ, of shared responsibility for international imbalances, and to 
grant a public-spirited institution the power to counteract tendencies to recur to rentier-like attitude, thereby 
ʹsocializing altruismʹ (Carabelli and De Vecchi 2001) to pursue social justice. The ICU plan was meant to 
recreate on a permanent basis the lucky historical conditions that had permitted harmonious relationships 
between ʹold-establishedʹ and ʹnewly-developingʹ countries (CW 25, p. 22) – loans were ʹself-liquidating 
because they themselves created new sources of paymentʹ (p. 23) – in the pre-war gold standard. The belief 
that ʹliberal credit and loan arrangements between the creditor and the debtor countries [flow] from the mere 
fact of an unbalanced creditor-debtor positionʹ was based on a ʹfalse analogyʹ (ib.). Only by compelling 
creditors to share the adjustment burden with debtor countries was it possible to grant ʹa means of 
reassurance to a troubled world, by which any country whose own affairs are conducted with due prudence 
is relieved of anxiety, for causes which are not of its own making, concerning its ability to meet its 
international liabilities; and which will, therefore, make unnecessary those methods of restriction and 
discrimination which countries have adopted hitherto, not on their merits, but as measures of self-protection 
from disruptive outside forcesʹ (p. 449). 
ʹThe post-war world must not be content with patchworkʹ (CW 25, p. 26), Keynes added to reject the 
alternatives of an ad hoc redistribution of the American gold or of a role of growth locomotive to be assigned 
to the United States. The new system should require ʹthe chief initiative from the creditor countries, whilst 
maintaining enough discipline in the debtor countries to prevent them from exploiting the new ease allowed 
them in living profligately beyond their meansʹ (p. 30). Undesired capital flows, hitherto ʹthe major cause of 
instabilityʹ (p. 31), should be eliminated through strict controls as an essential feature of the new system. In 
the plan, the ICU issues a newly-created bank money (bancor) as the new international standard. Deficits 
and surpluses in the balance of payments would have been settled through the use of clearing accounts at 
the ICU, denominated in the new standard. Central banks would buy and sell their currencies against such 
liabilities and credits. ʹWhat made the ICU revolutionary was that, by issuing its own currency, the ICU 
could create reserves as requiredʹ by the needs of international trade (Turnell 2002, p. 17). Each country was 
in fact given the opportunity to draw its own bancor quota, equal to half the average value of its total trade 
for the last five pre-war years. Exchange rates were fixed (in terms of a unit of bancor) but adjustable. As to 
the management of international disequilibria, creditor countries would be allowed and, the case being, 
required to revalue their currencies and unblock foreign investments. Credits exceeding in amount a quarter 
of their quota would be charged rising interest rates; those exceeding the quota itself at the end of a year 
would have been directly transferred to the ICU. Symmetrically, debtor countries would be allowed or asked 
to devalue their currencies, to sell gold and to prohibit capital exports; their excessive debts would have been 
charged interest, though lower than those applied to creditors’ excessive balances.  
The ʹheart of the matterʹ, Moggridge argues, ʹwas to encourage balance of payments adjustmentʹ 
(1992, p. 674). But the plan also sought ʹto protect the economic vision implicit in The General Theory from the 
power of the rentier nationsʹ (Mini 1994, p. 194; see also Meltzer 1989). At the basis of the ʹrevolutionʹ of the 
ICU was what Keynes defined as the ʹbanking principleʹ, a portentous direct attack against rentiers. ʹThe idea 
underlying my proposals for a Currency Union is simple, namely to generalise the essential principles of 
banking, as it is exhibited within any closed system, through the establishment of an International Clearing 
Bank. The principle is the necessary equality of credits and debits, of assets and liabilities. If no credits are 
removed outside the banking system but only transferred within it, the Bank itself can never be in difficultiesʹ 
(CW 25, p. 44). Remindful of the General Theory, the ICU system deals with a closed world: at the 
supranational level, international imbalances reduce to zero. As Keynes had observed in the Twenties, that 
between ʹthe debt of the individualʹ and ʹthe debt of the stateʹ is a ʹfalse analogy. There is no real analogy 
between the two. An individual’s motives for clearing himself of debt may apply to the external obligations 
of the state; but they can have no application to its internal obligationsʹ (CW 19, p. 368). Once however the 
world is closed, so to speak, by the ICU, the ʹdead hand of debtʹ cannot impose its burden any longer on the 
system’s members. As Keynes himself remarks in the third draft of the plan, facilities allowed to countries by 
the system ʹare made possible by the nature of the system itself and do not involve particular indebtedness 
between one member state and another. A country is in credit or debit with the Currency Union as a whole. 
This means that the overdraft facilities, whilst a relief to some, are not a real burden to othersʹ (CW 25, p. 74). 
So much for Keynes’s first criticism of rentiers. But creditor countries would not have found it in 
their interest any longer to demand money instead of goods. ʹIn the first days of banking great stress was 
laid on the possession of capital but we have learned as time goes on that it is of insignificant importance. 
You need the capital if you are not in a closed system and have to meet liabilities for credit outside your 
system, but in a closed system you can reach your conclusion by simply off-setting the deposits of some 
members against the overdrafts of others. The deposits on the one side are necessarily exactly equal to the 
overdrafts on the other, so that as there is no lability to pay outside the system it involves no risk and 
therefore requires no capitalʹ (CW 25, p. 210). Creditors will not feel any advantage in hoarding surplus 
resources, since ʹ[n]o country need be in possession of a credit balance unless it deliberately prefers to sell 
more than it buys (or lends); no country becomes unliquid or is prevented from employing its credit balance 
whenever it chooses to do so; and no country suffers injury (but on the contrary) by the fact that the balance, 
which it does not choose to employ for the time being is not withdrawn from circulationʹ (pp. 74-75).  
Creditors are allowed the possibility to choose how to employ their surpluses – expansion of credit 
and domestic demand, currency appreciation or wages increase, abatement of trade restrictions or foreign 
lending for development – provided they effectively use them, to avoid being charged interests on their 
excessive balances, instead of ʹremain[ing] entirely passiveʹ (CW 25, p. 78). In Keynes’s words: ʹ[i]n the 
absence of the Clearing Union a creditor country can employ the proceeds of its exports to buy goods or to 
buy investments, or to make temporary advances and to hold temporary overseas balances, or to buy gold in 
the market. All these facilities will remain at its disposal. The difference is that in the absence of the Clearing 
Union, more or less automatic forces come into play to restrict the volume of its exports after the above 
means of receiving payment for them have been exhausted. Certain countries become unable to buy and, in 
addition to this, there is an automatic tendency towards a general slump in international trade and, as a 
result, a reduction in the exports of the creditor country. Thus, the effect of the Clearing Union is to give the 
creditor country a choice between voluntarily curtailing its exports to the same extent that they would have 
been involuntarily curtailed in the absence of the Clearing Union, or, alternatively, of allowing its exports to 
continue and accumulating the excess receipts in the form of bancor balances for the time beingʹ (p. 457). 
Finally, Keynes gets rid of the functionless international rentier. His proposal ʹaims at the 
substitution of an expansionist, in place of a contractionist, pressure on world tradeʹ (CW 25, p. 74). ʹEvilsʹ 
ensued in the past for debtor countries from creditors remaining passive, but the virtuous of the banking 
principle were simply miraculous. ʹThe substitution of a credit mechanism in place of hoarding would have 
repeated in the international field the same miracle already performed in the domestic field of turning a 
stone into breadʹ (p. 114). The turnabout, with respect to ʹthe utilitarian and economic – one might almost say 
financial – ideal, as the sole, respectable purpose of community as a whole ... Bread and nothing but bread, 
and not even bread, and bread accumulating at compound interest until it has turned into a stoneʹ (CW 28, p. 
342), was complete. As remarked by Mini, the plan projected ʹsome of the ideas of the ʹEconomic Possibilities 
for Our Grandchildrenʹ into the international arenaʹ (1994, p. 194). It simply ʹobliterates the ancient notion 
that in matters of international trade a specie inflow is the just reward of virtue (thrift, efficiency, hard work) 
while a trade deficit is the punishment for profligacy, high living, inefficiencyʹ (p. 193).  
Keynes believed the scarcity of capital to be simply artificial. The General Theory assigns to the state 
the task of providing investable funds for the entrepreneurs through a policy of ʹsocialisation of investmentʹ 
(CW 7, p. 378) which should bring rentiers to euthanasia. For Keynes, the stock of capital available for 
investments could be so enlarged as to drive expected profit rates down to zero in a single generation. The 
ICU was required to accomplish a similar task at the international level. It could operate so as to eliminate 
the occurrence of deficits and surpluses: ʹ[t]here is great force in the contention that, if active employment 
and ample purchasing power can be sustained in the main centres of world trade, the problem of surpluses 
and unwanted exports will largely disappear even though under the most prosperous conditions there may 
remain some disturbances of trade and unforeseen situations requiring special remediesʹ (CW 25, p. 116). The 
combination of banking principle and bancor would have reduced the weight of gold in international 
economic relations and provided sufficient reserves for world trade.  
On commenting the first draft of Harry Dexter White’s plan for a Stabilisation Fund, Keynes 
remarked that the scheme was ʹonly helpful to those countries which have a gold reserve already and is only 
helpful to them in proportion to the amount of such gold reserve. If, however, a country has only a little gold 
and, therefore, needs much support, the scheme provides on the contrary that it shall receive only a little 
support. To him that hath it is given. No adequate provision is offered for what happens when the resources 
provided, which in some cases would be exceedingly moderate, have been used upʹ (CW 25, p. 160). White’s 
plan was simply too adherent to the gold standard: the volume of international currency could not be 
adjusted to need, and punishment and rewards were still there. Curiously enough, Keynes explained more 
accurately how the ICU could attain this result than how the state could bring about the end of ʹthe 
cumulative oppressive power of the capitalist to exploit the scarcity-value of capitalʹ (p. 376). But this 
analogy is certainly not a false one, as shown by Keynes himself: ʹ[t]he world's trading difficulties ... may be 
caused in a most acute form if a creditor country is constantly withdrawing international money from 
circulation and hoarding it, thus refusing to spend its income from abroad either on goods for home 
consumption or on investment overseas. We have lately come to understand more clearly than before how 
employment and the creation of new incomes out of new production can only be maintained through the 
expenditure on goods and services of the income previously earned. This is equally true of home trade and 
of foreign trade. A foreign country equally can be the ultimate cause of unemployment by hoarding beyond 
the reasonable requirements of precautionʹ (pp. 272-73).  
 
VII. MORALS RATHER THAN FINANCE? ON THE NEGOTIATIONS OF THE 1945 AMERICAN LOAN  
Much of the literature overlooks that the explicit connection established by Keynes himself between 
American financial assistance to Britain during and after the war and the plans for global reform. In the 
second draft of the ICU plan, he clarified that ʹ[t]he assistance for which we can hope must be indirect and a 
consequence of setting the world as a whole on its feet and of laying the foundations of a sounder political 
economy between all nationsʹ (CW 25, p. 43). Not only, but assistance would come only ʹ[i]f we are to attract 
the interest and enthusiasm of the Americans, we must come with an ambitious plan of an international 
complexion, suitable to serve the interests of others besides ourselves, which to a hopeful spirit may carry a 
chance of making the post-war economy of the world more reasonable and promising than it was beforeʹ 
(ib.). In trying to solve her problems in the transition to the new order, Britain should not be contented with 
patchwork solutions, since it would be surely more satisfactory ʹto persuade the U.S. to enter into a general 
and collective responsibility, applying to all countries alike, that a country finding itself in a creditor position 
against the rest of the world as a whole should enter into an obligation to dispose of this credit balance and not 
to allow it meanwhile to exercise a contractionist pressure against the world economy and, by repercussion, 
against the economy of the creditor country itselfʹ (p. 47).  
The final Bretton Woods agreement had left the newly created international institutions with scarce 
resources to deal with the transition to the post-war order. Having ʹheld the [European] fort aloneʹ (CW 24, p. 
609) during the first years of the war, Britain was now facing four external problems (see Pressnell 1986, 
2003): first, the expiration of American and Canadian financial assistance to Britain under the Lend Lease 
agreement of March 1941. Second, enormous wartime financial obligations – the balances of the sterling area 
countries in particular, who had accepted to centralize their gold and foreign exchange reserves in London in 
exchange for sterling –, which Keynes saw as a reflection of the practical impossibility to revise the financial 
responsibilities for the war between Britain and the United States since they entered the war. Third, the need 
of external long-term finance, in particular from America, to ease a dramatic transition to the post-war order. 
Fourth, the commitment, established by Roosevelt as the price for Lend-Lease to the free-trade post-war 
world embodied in the famous ‚Article VII‛ of the Mutual Aid Agreement of February 1942.  
Scarcity of reserves, the burden of expenditures for relief and reconstruction and the gloomy 
prospects of Britain’s exports in the post-war period could but reduce the chances of balancing Britain’s 
external account in the transition period while returning to sterling convertibility. Transition to peacetime 
would have seen Britain burdened with a cumulative deficit of ₤2 billion ($8 billion) to be borrowed outside 
the sterling area, which would have certainly registered an overall deficit after the war. London could invoke 
a new settlement of the financial sharing of defence by the Sterling Dominions, who had built up ʹwar profits 
at our expenseʹ (CW 24, p. 268); yet, having ʹpersuaded the other countries concerned to entrust us with 
virtually the whole of their accruing external reservesʹ, Britain could not, in Keynes’s view, ʹrefuse to make at 
least part of these available in so far as they are required for immediate needsʹ (p. 8). As Keynes had 
successfully prophetized in 1942, therefore, Britain would have run the risk, at the end of the war, of 
appearing as an illegitimate beggar: ʹ[u]nless we can discover some better and clearer manifest, we, who will 
in fact have borne the brunt of the financial sacrifice of the war and literally alone amongst the Allies will have 
suffered a serious reversal of our overseas financial position, will appear as having, on the one hand, played 
a nasty confidence trick on the rest of the sterling area, and on the other, as having deceived our American 
friends into putting more money than we really requiredʹ (CW 23, pp. 247-48). 
 
1. Overseas Financial Policy in Stage III 
In response to the prospected expiration of the Lend Lease Agreement, Keynes designed, in his 
memorandum ʹOverseas Financial Policy in Stage IIIʹ of March 1945, a ʹbold scheme for an international 
policy of multilateralism in trade and payments that would simultaneously make sterling’s problems more 
manageable and justify Britain in seeking and America in giving financial assistance ʹ (Pressnell 1986, p. 237). 
Keynes knew that ʹthe financial and commercial arrangements of a considerable section of the world have 
become almost inextricably intertwined with our own financial and economic affairs in Londonʹ (CW 24, p. 
462), so that the three mutually exclusive scenarios for Britain’s future depicted in the memorandum were 
also those of global multilateralism. In the absence of American assistance, Britain would find herself 
confined in a ʹStarvation Cornerʹ, having to adopt a unilateral policy of austerity and isolationism at a 
moment when, due to the overall deficit of the sterling area, she had inevitably to resort to foreign 
borrowing to finance her debts. The Schachtian consequences of this scenario would have favored ʹnot 
merely the acceptance but the advocacy ... of a system of international economy after the war of a kind to 
which all sections of opinion, not only in the United States but also in Canada, are bitterly opposed ʹ (pp. 271-
72). In Keynes’s second scenario, ʹTemptationʹ, Britain receives  American financial assistance in the form of a 
loan ($5-8 billion) on easy terms, allowing Britain the breathing space to face the transition to the new order 
and to approach its debt problems with the sterling area. In exchange for the loan, London should have 
guaranteed free multilateral clearing within the area from the outset and the dismantlement of the empire, 
thereby coming to accept the ʹAmerican conception of the international economic systemʹ (p. 61) which 
Roosevelt had established as the price of the Lend-Lease agreement.  
Yielding to Temptation, in other words, Britain would have been forced (not differently from 
Germany) ʹinto conformity with an economic policy designed from withoutʹ, and compelled to ask for 
ʹmercy and defermentʹ (CW 24, p. 278). ʹIt is not as the result of some statistical calculation about what we 
might be able to manageʹ, Keynes claimed, ʹthat the mind revolts from accepting the counsels of Temptation. 
The fundamental reasons for rejection are incommensurable in terms of cashʹ (ib.). The American loan would 
have in fact sacrificed ʹthe sweet breath of Justice between partnersʹ in the war ʹto some false analogy of 
ʹbusinessʹʹ (p. 279). As Keynes had observed, in perfect continuity with his statements on WWI Inter-Allied 
debts, ʹ[t]o commercialise a war debt between Allies which leaves no productive asset behind, would be 
unreasonable and wrong. Interest, where there is not and in the nature of things could not have been any 
current income yielded by the loan has been stigmatised in most ages of history, except when the false 
analogies of trade were wholly dominant, as an intolerable and immoral imposition. To repay capital 
instalments is bad enough when no asset corresponds to the loan. But it is honourable, having received 
assistance in kind, to return the equivalent as time and opportunity permitsʹ (p. 48).  
 Only ʹJusticeʹ, that is ʹa general re-consideration of the proper burden of the costs of the warʹ, could 
allow Britain to be the Americans’ partner ʹin setting up a post-war international economy of the character on 
which they have set their heartsʹ (CW 24, p. 280). In addition to the $5 billion credit line at easy conditions of 
ʹTemptationʹ, ʹJusticeʹ required the United States to grant Britain $3 billion as a sort of retrospective Lend-
Lease agreement. In exchange, Britain would have guaranteed the de facto convertibility of sterling (initially 
limited to the area’s current earnings) within a year after the termination of war. This kind of support would 
have made it possible for Britain to approach the members of the sterling area, called upon to contribute a 
proportion of their balances ʹto the costs of the common victoryʹ (p. 281), with proposals for solving the 
sterling balances problem. Such liabilities would have been divided into three portions, one part to be made 
fully convertible and available to meet a deficit on current account (£750 million), one part to be funded 
(£1,500 million) and one part to be cancelled (£880 million). Allowing for such mitigations, Britain would 
then be left with sufficient gold and exchange reserves and a not intolerable liabilities/reserves ratio to face 
ʹthe economic future without any serious anxietyʹ (p. 290). For reasons of ʹhonourʹ, ʹjusticeʹ and ʹpracticeʹ, 
Britain could not resort to debt repudiation. Unless such burdens were mitigated, however, Britain could not 
ʹfor several years to come participate in the free international economy upon which the Americans have set 
their hearts and which we also, no less than they, vastly prefer if it is made practicable for usʹ (p. 291). The 
United States, Keynes concluded, ʹwill never have a better chance of a wise act at so modest a costʹ (ib.): $3 
billion were the war cost for the Americans for a fortnight, he commented, adding that such contribution 
would enable them ʹto dispose over a period of foreign surplus far below what they are likely in any case to 
develop, a surplus of which in any case they will have to find means of riddanceʹ (ib.).  
 
2. The proposal of an American gift  
As known, Keynes lost his battle: in the end, Washington offered a generous loan (3.75 billions dollar on easy 
terms), and Britain, pace Keynes, accepted it. Did Keynes really hope for, and count on, an American gift to 
Britain, as maintained by Harrod (1951) and Gardner (1980)? As seen, Skidelsky (2000) believes so, but sees 
the proposal as Keynes’s most important mistake in his fighting for Britain. In this regard, morals may 
certainly be an illusion, as Skidelsky argues, but also a tactic: Ferrrari Bravo argues that Keynes had no 
alternative to avoid projecting himself ʹimmediately in that realm of utilitarian considerations towards which 
the stronger financial counterpart tended to moveʹ (1990, p. 272, our translation). In Pressnell’s account (1986), 
Keynes’s proposal as agreed on in the major meeting of the British negotiators on 23 August 1945 was a 
strategic camouflage of the expected loan, ʹnot so much serious beliefs as an attractive marker, to compare 
the most favourable possible outcome with the least favourableʹ (p. 265). ʹThe aim was to seek at the outset, 
not unnaturally, preferred British goalsʹ, says Pressnell: the proposal of an American gift could serve as an 
excuse to complain of the final loan agreement, which ʹeven if regarded as broadly reasonable in London, 
should nevertheless appear to be of American inspirationʹ (p. 266). 
 It is our belief that by neatly separating ethics from economics, that is by failing to consider the 
ethical dimension of Keynes’s diplomacy, both these interpretations of the proposal of an American gift, the 
ʹgift as tacticʹ view and Skidelsky’s ʹmorals rather than financeʹ argument, cannot avoid a reductionist stance. 
The correspondence on the proposal, in Spring 1945, between Keynes and the treasury representative in 
Washington, Robert H. Brand, helps remedy this omission (see Carabelli and Cedrini 2010c). On 
commenting Keynes’s memorandum, Brand argued that what Britain could propose as justice for her, on the 
basis of the United States’ late entry into the war, would not be considered by the Americans as justice for 
them. It was likely in the interest of the United States to help Britain; yet, ʹ[i]f they were to give [a gift], the 
Americans would certainly regard it as an act, not of justice, but of generosityʹ, he stressed, and suggested 
asking for ʹsomething that looked a little less like a free giftʹ (CW 24, p. 308). Keynes disagreed. Since ʹ [t]he 
various elements in the policy of trying to march with the U.S. in the post-war economic set-up all hang 
togetherʹ (p. 316), only an American gift could allow Britain to reach a satisfactory settlement with its sterling 
creditors and guarantee the United States the desired measure of convertibility. Temptation would impose 
their burden of ʹdistastefulʹ second-best policies for Britain, policies which would prove ʹobjectionableʹ (ib.) 
to the Americans and carry the risk of an ʹunbalanced settlementʹ (p. 317) with them. The gift was thus, in 
Keynes’s view, a strictly necessary condition for keeping up with the declared commitment towards free 
trade.  
 In fact, Keynes stood resolutely against ʹanything in the nature of a specific bargainʹ (CW 24, p. 324). 
ʹThe appeal to justiceʹ, he observed in a letter to Sir Wilfrid Eady of the Treasury, ʹdoes not necessarily 
suggest any lack of generosity on the part of U.S. It is a wider conception about the way in which the 
financial consequences of the war should be liquidatedʹ (p. 360). ʹ[T]oo exclusive an appeal to American self-
interestʹ might have been ʹmisjudgedʹ (ib.), but America was, as he later wrote in a memorandum to Hugh 
Dalton, a ʹbusiness country where it is a moral duty and not merely a self-regarding act to make any money 
which the traffic will bear and the law allowʹ (p. 548). This required ʹsome imitation of a normal banking 
transactionʹ (ib.). Still, the unspecific bargain Keynes had in mind was simply that between the American gift 
and Britain’s acceptance of ʹthe kind of post-war worldʹ (p. 328) wanted by the Americans themselves, 
namely the multilateral world of free trade that the United States would otherwise ʹfail to get, here and nowʹ 
(ib.). For instance, the United States could demand a commitment by the sterling countries to have a part in 
the reconstruction of Britain. It could thus be settled that ʹthe $3 billion from the U.S. should be matched by 
cancellations by the sterling creditors of an at least equal amountʹ (p. 324). Finally, Keynes brought forward a 
non-economic argument supporting the idea of the gift at least as an ʹopening gambitʹ (p. 339). A gift would 
facilitate the task of prompting the sterling area countries to fall in with the proposal: ʹIf America insists on 
remaining on a strictly economic basis, that makes it harder for the others to depart from it. I attach 
predominant importance to this psychological atmosphere of the free giftʹ (p. 340).  
 Keynes’s correspondence with Brand makes it evident that in his 1945 diplomacy, Keynes was using 
an updated version of the model of international adjustment implicit in his suggestions for the settlement of 
reparations and Inter-Allied debts at the end of World War I. Britain was now at the center of a generalized 
conflict involving virtually all members of a highly imbalanced interdependent world, inhabited by only one 
surplus country and a plethora of deficit nations compelled to choose between the return to distasteful 
isolationist interwar policies and the acceptance of a new sounder order for which they were financially 
unprepared. Keynes’s 1945 memorandum and his writings in economic diplomacy at the end of World War I 
have in common their ultimate aim, namely to revamp global multilateralism, as well as the means to 
achieve this result, that is a ʹgift dynamicsʹ to promote a multilateral resolution of global imbalances. The 
involvement of a third actor – European creditors at the end of the First World War and the sterling area in 
1945 – in a process which looks as (and has been traditionally treated as such) a bilateral relationship, is 
typical of gift-giving situations, and sheds light on the systemic character of gifts, which link together ʹmany 
partners in a chain, creating a complex pathʹ (Godbout 2000, p. 130; see Cedrini 2010). The moving from the 
Starvation Corner toward Justice, passing through Temptation, is to be seen as the progressive enlargement of 
the spectrum of countries taking part in the adjustment to a more equilibrated world. Justice and the 
ʹAmerican Giftʹ, the starting mechanism of this chain of generosity, was in Keynes’s view the only possibility 
to induce the sterling countries to play the part they only could play in revitalizing world trade through their 
exchanges with America (see De Cecco 1979). The economic necessity of the Marshall plan after the 1947 
sterling convertibility crisis was later to confirm that the defence of Britain’s destiny was in truth that of ʹthe 
considerable section of the worldʹ whose economic affairs had become ʹalmost inextricably intertwinedʹ with 
those of London. 
 
VII. KEYNES’S ETHICS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS  
At least on one point, Skidelsky’s account of Keynes’s diplomacy at the end of World War II is correct. The 
analysis of Keynes’s ethics of international economic relations shows in effect, as the historian claims in his 
latest book (2009), that justice was not an end in Keynes’s vision, exactly as it was not in Moore’s philosophy. 
Keynes treated justice instrumentally, as a means to a good life, which is in his vision the ultimate ethical 
end. ʹControversies as to relative sacrifice are very barren and very foolish also; for there is no reason in the 
world why relative sacrifice should be equal – so many other very relevant considerations being quite 
different in the two casesʹ (CW 2, p. 174), says the Keynes of The Economic Consequences of the Peace. As seen, 
his comparisons of relative sacrifices after the two world wars were generically inspired to an idea of justice 
as ʹfairnessʹ (see Skidelsky 2009) and equity. Yet in 1945, Keynes found the fact that Britain had held the fort 
alone for the first years of war a compelling reason for asking the Americans and the sterling countries to 
fairly contribute to costs of the conflict. After all, even in case of American assistance of the kind desired by 
Keynes, the British would ʹstill remain the only country in the Alliance left at the end of the war with its 
overseas earnings heavily mortgaged as a result of it – most of the others would still find themselves in 
substantial profit at our expense. We should still have fought, so to speak, as the only non-mercenariesʹ (CW 
24, p. 289).  
Keynes could see the rest of the Allies as ʹmercenariesʹ, at the end of the war, because he believed it 
morally wrong to make profits from a war which was in truth a ʹcommon causeʹ among friends. The anti-
utilitarianism of his vision of international relationships shows that morals was not a veil to him. Awareness 
of the non-economic character of war debts coupled with that of the evils they were to impose on 
international relations uncovers the various false analogies of economicistic nature produced by 
purposiveness, love of money and the overestimation of the economic problem in human society. As 
happens in the General Theory (see Carabelli 1991) with the classical theory, Keynes’s criticism of the 
American view of Inter-Allied debts is first of all of a methodological nature: after discovering the 
(economistic) hypotheses tacitly introduced in this reasoning and finding that their validity is limited to 
particular cases, Keynes is able to conclude that the analogy between such debts and ordinary business 
investments is a false one.  
Still, at the end of World War I, Keynes had counted on ʹforeign trade argumentsʹ to persuade the 
United States to sustain the European recovery, whereas during the interwar period, in peacetime – that is, 
when debts among nations are effectively of a commercial nature – he came to develop an even more violent 
criticism of the rentier-like attitude of creditor countries, and to accuse the latter of failure to take 
responsibility for the managing of global imbalances. His moral criticism of the Temptation option in 1945 is 
remindful of the attack launched on rentier nations during the interwar period, when creditors had ceased to 
be ʹreasonableʹ, although it was now their duty to be so. This change does not rest on an absolute 
radicalization of his ethics; rather, in line with Burke’s political philosophy, duty in Keynes’s view is relative 
to times and circumstances. When the latter change, duties change too (see Helburn 1992).  
Keynes’s battle against the burden of WWI Inter-Allied debts wars was inspired by his belief that the 
international economic problem was but ʹa transitory and an unnecessary muddleʹ (CW 9, p. xvii) absurdly 
denying countries the possibility to free themselves from economic pressures and anxieties. Then, having 
demonstrated that the golden fetters of the badly-ruled interwar gold standard were responsible for the 
economic disaster of the Thirties, Keynes reshaped the global order in such a way as to defuse what he had 
come to define as the dilemma of the international system, that between international discipline and national 
autonomy. The appearance of the dilemma and accrued awareness of the rentier-like nature of creditor 
nations’ behaviour in the interwar period led Keynes to fix more precisely the boundaries of his anti-
utilitarian view of international economic relations.  
In Keynes’s vision, economics is concerned with providing men the material preconditions for the 
enjoyment of a happy life and the possibility of individual choice of ends. Freedom from economic pressures 
discloses ʹthe possibilities of personal lifeʹ (CW 9, p. 125): more precisely, therefore, ʹfreedomʹ in Keynes’s 
philosophy is to be intended as ʹfreedom to chooseʹ. When Keynes refers to the ʹdilemma of the international 
systemʹ, he is using the term ʹdilemmaʹ in a precise way, which he had already defined in his early writings 
on ethics (see Carabelli 1998; Carabelli and Cedrini 2009). Moral and rational dilemmas derive from the 
existence of a plurality and variety of heterogeneous goodness, moral ends and values, or reasons and 
evidences for action, which both imply the possibility of a clash between irreconcilable claims. The dilemma 
between international discipline and national autonomy compels the system’s countries to decide what to 
privilege and what to sacrifice in the search for national economic welfare. Finding himself a sure victim of 
the dilemma, Keynes had no doubt, and opted for National Self-Sufficiency, at an epoch when Britain was 
suffering ʹnot because we are poorer than we were but because other values seem to have been sacrificed and 
because they seem to have been sacrificed unnecessarily, inasmuch as our economic system is not, in fact, 
enabling us to exploit to the utmost the possibilities for economic wealth afforded by the progress of our 
technique, but falls far short of this, leading us to feel that we might as well have used up the margin in more 
satisfying waysʹ (CW 21, pp. 242-43). 
The shaping of the new Bretton Woods order provided Keynes with the opportunity to solve the 
dilemma. The attention he had posed on the morals of international debts and the clash between the 
competing interests of rentier nations and those of the system as a whole helped him identify, in continuity 
with his analysis of domestic economies, the need for a public-spirited international institution able to able 
to remedy to the negative effects of social complexity (such as fallacies of composition, prevalence of 
conventional over reasonable expectations, and so on). Yet, in establishing the rules of the new desired global 
order, Keynes insisted more on the freedom and autonomy of the system’s members than on the obligations 
imposed to them by the new international discipline. Trying to defend the ICU plan from various criticisms 
over time, he declared that the plan ʹleaves each country to be the judge of its own needsʹ (CW 25, p. 276), 
whereas the other experiments of the interwar laboratory were likely to be influenced ʹby extraneous, 
political reasonsʹ and tended to put ʹindividual countries in a position of particular obligation towards 
othersʹ (p. 178). Since the banking principle was but an extension of the ʹimpersonalʹ methods of any 
domestic banking system (p. 192) to the international sphere, debtor countries would have been dependent 
on the ʹanonymous and impersonal aid of the system as a wholeʹ (p. 193). In general, Keynes stressed that 
ʹ[n]o particular member states have to engage their own resources as such to the support of other particular 
states or any of the international projects or policies adoptedʹ (p. 191) by the ICU. As to surplus countries, he 
pointed out that the plan included ʹno provision by which the creditor is limited in his liability to accept a 
credit balance with the institution if he chooses not to use it ... He is still left with every conceivable liberty he 
has nowʹ (pp. 211-212). More, the plan was an ʹextra facilityʹ to the creditor country, ʹfor it allows it to carry 
on its trade with the rest of the world unimpeded, whenever a time lag between earning and spending 
happens to suit its own convenienceʹ (p. 276).  
 Keynes regarded the ICU as ‚a measure of financial disarmament‛ (CW 25, p. 57) which would 
favour ʹnot only < the general advantage but also < the individual advantage of each of the participantsʹ (p. 
235). It was the duty’s plan to avoid repeating ʹthe error of the gold standardʹ, which ʹlay in submitting 
national wage-policies to outside dictation. It is wiser to regard stability (or otherwise) of internal prices as a 
matter of internal policy and politicsʹ (CW 26, p. 33). It was an ʹillusionʹ, he had written in 1935, ʹthat the 
international system of the future must necessarily be a uniform oneʹ (CW 21, p. 356). Keynes firmly believed 
that ʹthere should be the least possible interference with internal national policies and the plan should not 
wander from the international terrainʹ (CW 25, p. 234). In Kirshner’s (2009) view, the ultimate reason why 
Keynes struggled against laissez-faire as regards international capital movements was his conviction that 
ʹdistinct national circumstances implied that heterogeneity, not homogeneity was appropriate across various 
states’ macroeconomic policiesʹ (p. 534). But such heterogeneity cannot manifest itself except in a global 
order leaving its member countries free to choose among different national policies.  
 Keynes’s diplomacy in the context of the negotiations of the American loan offers relevant 
information on the traits of his desired new order. As seen, aiming at providing a truly multilateral response 
to post-war imbalances, the proposal of an American gift provides clear continuity with the ICU plan. More 
importantly, however, a gift-giving analysis of Keynes’s proposal demonstrates that ʹOverseas Financial 
Policy in Stage IIIʹ truly embodies the same revolutionary spirit of Keynes’s desired new system, to the extent 
that it has been correctly described as ʹa trigger mechanism for the creation of a Keynesian worldʹ (Newton 
2000, p. 199). After borrowing Marshall Sahlins’s (1972) work on the norm of reciprocity, Keynes’s desired 
global order may be described as the attempt to leave aside the ʹnegative reciprocityʹ of the interwar period – 
when countries ʹconfront*ed+ each other as opposed interests, each looking to maximize utility at the other’s 
expenseʹ (p. 195) – to endorse the ʹbalanced reciprocityʹ which is typical of orders where social relationships 
depend on material flows. Since systems governed by a norm of perfectly balanced reciprocity are generally 
unstable and likely to degenerate into a state of exploitative social relationships, the balanced reciprocity of 
the ʹbanking principleʹ in Keynes’s scheme must be supplemented by sanctions such as those that 
strengthened the ʹshared responsibilitiesʹ principle of the ICU, or be helped to progressively approach the 
ʹpositive reciprocityʹ model implicit in the proposal of an American gift. 
 A gift-giving analysis of Keynes’s proposal shows however that this is not the whole story. 
Modernity, and economics in primis, tend to repudiate the complexity of the gift by defining it through one 
and only one of its various components (interest and disinterest, egoism and altruism, freedom and 
obligation; see Caillé 1998). This way, the so-called paradox of the free gift is bound to arise – ʹthere is no gift 
that brings a higher return than the free gift, the gift given with no strings attachedʹ (Gouldner 1973, p. 277), 
yet ʹ[a] gift that does nothing to enhance solidarity is a contradictionʹ, as Mary Douglas argues (1990, p. vii) 
on commenting Marcel Mauss’s The Gift. Unable to bring into question its ʹmost basic Lawʹ, namely ʹthat one 
cannot get something for nothingʹ (Harrod 1948, p. 36), economics in particular cannot succeed in grasping 
the ‚between‛ character of the gift relationship (see Zenou et al., 1993). A prolongation but also a different 
vehicle of the spirit of Keynes’s plans to reform the global architecture, the proposal of an American gift is 
characterized by a play of freedom and obligation of the same kind of that discussed by Mauss in his 
masterpiece.  
In his speech to the Lords of 23 May 1944, Keynes stressed that the ʹshared responsibilityʹ principle 
of the Joint Statement of Bretton Woods would not have been possible without ʹa voluntary undertaking, 
genuinely offered in the spirit both of a good neighbour and, I should add, of enlightened self-interest, not to 
allow a repetition of a chain of events which between the wars did more than any other single factor to 
destroy the world’s economic balance and to prepare a seed-bed for foul growthsʹ (CW 26, p. 14). This 
association of ʹvoluntarismʹ with ʹenlightened self-interestʹ parallels Keynes’s opinion about the absence of 
any ʹobligationʹ (CW 18, p. 300), for the Americans, to comply with his proposals for a mitigation of WWI 
Inter-Allied debts, which the United States could not be expected to offer ʹunconditionallyʹ (p. 299). And, to 
come to the American gift proposal, Keynes never asked directly for it, since he wanted the Americans 
themselves to make the offer in recognition of Britain’s effort in financing the war. Nevertheless, the 
Americans were ʹgreatly at fault, in *his+ judgement, for having no constructive proposals whatever to offer 
to a suffering and distracted Europeʹ (CW 2, p. 94) in the negotiations of Versailles. And, on defending the 
American loan agreement in his speech to the House of Lords of 18 December 1945, he went so far as to 
admit ʹI shall never so long as I live cease to regret that this is not an interest-free loan. The charging of 
interest is out of tune with the underlying realities. It is based on a false analogyʹ (CW 24, p. 613). 
The pattern of social interactions implicit in Keynes’s diplomacy with the Americans in particular is 
therefore far from simple. In the correspondence with Brand on the 1945 memorandum, Keynes stresses the 
need to avoid a specific bargain between American assistance and Britain’s commitment towards free global 
trade. In short, he insists on unconditionality. The ʹpsychological atmosphere of the free giftʹ should serve as 
a means of reaching a settlement which would have been otherwise impossible to attain by agreement; the 
element ʹchang*ing] the environment within which individuals operateʹ, inducing ʹbehaviour to conform to 
goals which were attainable only bypassing individualistic motivation or utilitarian calculationsʹ (Marcuzzo 
2008, p. 36). Keynes’s approach was thus based not on ambiguity-resolving devices, but on the structural 
uncertainty that is typical of gift-giving situations, wherein it plays the role of precondition for establishing a 
social bond between actors previously regarding each other as rivals (see Godbout 1998). It was, in other 
terms, an approach of ʹconditional unconditionalityʹ, that is of an unconditionality which is in truth 
conditional to the appearance of positive interactions and necessarily lives under the threat of falling back to 
the unconditional diffidence of the clash of interests (see Caillé 1998).  
That measure of social indebtedness which Keynes desired every partner involved to positively 
appreciate as a precondition for working together on a new world order was based on clearing up not the 
past, but its dramatic consequences on the future, in the form of market indebtedness – as Keynes himself 
declared in his speech to the Lords, ʹin no phase of human experience does the past operate so directly and 
arithmetically as we were trying to contend. Men’s sympathies and less calculated impulses are drawn from 
their memories of comradeship, but their contemporary acts are generally directed towards influencing the 
future and not towards pensioning the pastʹ (CW 24, p. 610). As any gift, Keynes’s American gift is inhabited 
by a strange mix of freedom and obligation, where ʹthe obligation to give is a paradoxical obligation to be 
free and to oblige others to be free tooʹ (Caillé 2005, p. 6). Britain’s countergift to the United States was the 
promise to help the Americans to develop the kind of post-war world they desired. Only a gift, in fact, could 
allow Britain the ʹreal liberty of actionʹ needed ʹto offer from the start the full multilateralism of trade and 
exchange which will be the best inducement to the Americans to fall in with our proposalsʹ (CW 24, p. 276). 
But this was also the post-war world Britain herself desired: the Americans had the possibility to ʹmake us an 
offer, not so much generous as just, using their financial strength not as an instrument to force us to their 
will, but as a means of making it possible for us to participate in arrangements which we ourselves prefer on 
their merits if only they can be made practicable for usʹ (p. 272). Contrary to common sense interpretations of 
gift-giving situations in terms of the power of the donor on the donee, Keynes adopts a Maussian view of 
exchange, and stresses that the difference between a loan and a gift lies in the repercussions they would 
respectively have on the freedom to choose of the receiver. Granting a loan, the Americans would have 
forced Britain to their will, that is to accept the American conception of the international economic system. 
Offering a gift as ʹan act that widens the scope of freedom for the members of a societyʹ (Godbout 1998, p. 
190), they would have granted Britain the freedom to proactively choose and help to shape the multilateral 
option. 
Keynes’s proposal of an American gift shows therefore that Skidelsky’s ʹmorals rather than financeʹ 
argument is ill-conceived. For Keynes, morals and finance were both means to a non-material end, namely 
the autonomy of individual judgement and the possibility of individual choice of ends. ʹOf greater and more 
permanent significanceʹ than the ʹsupposed necessitiesʹ of the economic problem (CW 9, p. 332), freedom to 
choose is the key for attaining what ʹthe future holds in store for usʹ, that is ʹmore wealth and economic 
freedom and possibilities of personal life than the past has ever offered. There is no reason why we should 
not feel ourselves free to be bold, to be open, to experiment, to take action, to try the possibility of thingsʹ 
(CW 9, pp. 124-25). In the General Theory, Keynes justifies his calls for ʹcentral controlsʹ (CW 7, p. 379) as 
means to attain full employment while safeguarding the ʹtraditional advantages of individualismʹ, which ʹis 
the best safeguard of personal liberty in the sense that, compared with any other system, it greatly widens 
the field for the exercise of personal choice. It is also the best safeguard of the variety of life, which emerges 
precisely from this extended field of personal choiceʹ (p. 380).  
Under this light, ʹOverseas Financial Policy in Stage IIIʹ finally appear as a tester of the leader’s 
willingness to comply with the revolutionary spirit of the desired new system, despite the rejection of the 
ʹfreedom-enhancingʹ proposals advanced by Keynes for Bretton Woods. As a public institution explicitly 
designed to favour the general interest, the ICU was assigned by Keynes the ʹduty to be altruistic, in defence 
of the individualʹ (Carabelli and De Vecchi 2001, p. 244), that is of the individual country and its right to 
autonomous judgement. Keynes defended the Anglo-American negotiations in the Forties as the ʹfirst great 
attempt at organizing international order out of the chaos of the war in a way which will not interfere with 
the diversity of national policy yet which will minimize the causes of friction and ill will between nations ʹ 
(CW 24, p. 608). The unrestricted laissez-faire of the late gold standard and interwar period had ʹmistake*n+ 
private licence for public libertyʹ (CW 24, p. 622): it was thus ʹan advantage of the *ICU+ scheme that it invites 
the member states to abandon their licence to promote indiscipline, disorder and bad-neighbourliness 
which, to the general disadvantage, they have been free to exercise hithertoʹ (p. 195). The multilateral 
clearing agreement designed by Keynes was destined to reduce the tensions between national autonomy and 
international discipline which necessarily derive from global interdependence. His desired international 
system would have been able to solve by itself the dilemmas it raises by managing the co-habitation of 
different varieties of national capitalism instead of reducing them to a one-size-fits-all set of right policies 
and standards. If Keynes used moral arguments in his economic diplomacy, he did so to aid the cause of an 
ethics of international economic relations wherein discipline is exercised not against, but in favour of 
national policy space. 
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